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INTRODUCTION
Since the end of World War II, national economic policies have
become increasingly interdependent as countries have derived ever
greater economic vitality from the strengths and weaknesses of their
trading partners.' Indeed, the rise of the "new world order" may
replace the military might and strategic alliances that marked the
cold war era with economic power and trade blocs.2 One manifesta-
tion of this economic globalization is the rise of multinational busi-
nesses that establish numerous subsidiaries or affiliated companies
in various countries. 3 Although many reasons exist for multina-
1. See RICHARD N. ROSECRANCE, THE RISE OF THE TRADING STATE: COMMERCE AND CON-
QUEST IN THE MODERN WORLD 22, 31 (1986) (observing that since 1945 peaceful international
trading "is enjoying much greater efficacy than ever before" and noting that international
interdependence results from modern advances in technology, transportation, and communi-
cations); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Preface to Symposium, The U.S.-Japanese Trade Relationship: An
Interdisciplinary Approach for the 1990s, 22 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 371, 371 (1989) (discussing impact
of international trade on foreign policy).
2. See W. Allen Wallis, Economics, Foreign Policy, and United States-Japanese Trade Disputes,
22 CORNELL Ir'L L.J. 381, 381 (1989) (discussing increasing influence of economics in for-
eign policy considerations).
3. See MANUEL PIRES, INTERNATIONAL JURIDICAL DOUBLE TAXATION OF INCOME 3-4
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tional diversification, the existence of multinational corporations
may highlight differences between the countries in which multina-
tionals establish their subsidiaries. 4
One of the more difficult problems facing multinational busi-
nesses is the prospect of double taxation. 5 As the term suggests,
double taxation occurs when two or more countries claim jurisdic-
tion to tax the same income.6 Where uncertainty exists as to which
of two affiliated or commonly controlled companies in different
countries has earned taxable income to which both companies have
contributed, both countries might tax the same income.7 The affili-
ated group therefore may suffer tax liability in two different tax
jurisdictions.8
Double taxation generally occurs in the context of transfer pricing
adjustments, where tax authorities in competing jurisdictions disa-
gree over income allocations attributable to transfer pricing.9
Transfer pricing adjustment, at income allocation, is the means by
which national tax authorities assign market prices to related-party
(1989) (asserting that international movement of technology, people, goods, services, and
corporate capital is modem norm).
4. See Richard L. Kaplan, International Tax Enforcement and the Special Challenge of Transfer
Pricing, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 300-01 (observing that in context of multinational corpora-
tions, national tax authorities may act without regard for offshore effects); see also U.N. DEP'T
OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT 66,
U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/190, U.N. Sales No. E.73.I.A.11 (1973) [hereinafter MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT] (observing that multinational corporations pose in-
ternational tax problems not ordinarily associated with national companies).
5. See MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4, at 67 (stat-
ing that although all countries have right to tax income earned within their borders, some also
claim right to tax income earned in other countries by entities that are domiciled within their
jurisdiction). In the case where a country taxes income according to domicile, the home coun-
try's taxation of foreign income will result in double taxation. ed
6. See James R. Mogle, Competent Authority Procedure, 23 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
725, 725 (1990) (defining point at which double taxation occurs and discussing means for
eliminating it). The United States, for example, may tax all of a U.S. citizen's income, regard-
less of the income's place of origin. See Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924) (upholding
congressional power to tax foreign-source income earned by nonresident citizen). Thus, a
U.S. company whose own income is generated by an overseas affiliate must pay U.S. income
tax not only on its domestic income, but on any dividends paid to it by the foreign affiliate as
well. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 303 (noting that United States taxes dividends paid by for-
eign subdivision to U.S. parent).
7. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 300-01 (explaining that national tax authority's concerns
ordinarily are limited to corporate unit located within its jurisdiction without consideration of
fact that unit's income may also be taxable in another jurisdiction).
8. See Stanley E. Novack, Resolution of Competent Authority Issues, in TRANSFER PRICING FOR
INTANGIBLES: A COMMENTARY ON THE WHITE PAPER 46, 46-47 (Fred C. de Hosson ed., 1989)
(illustrating transaction resulting in simultaneous taxation of income by two tax jurisdictions).
9. See Mogle, supra note 6, at 725 (discussing requisite conditions for double taxation
disputes and observing that double taxation commonly occurs as result of related-party trans-
fers). Double taxation exists because tax authorities often employ different methods for de-
termining the appropriate income allocations attributable to transfers between related parties.
See infra text accompanying notes 15-39 (discussing arm's length standard and alternate
means of attributing transfer prices to intracorporate transfers).
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transactions in order to clarify the income attributable to each seg-
ment of a multinational corporation, thereby performing the role
reserved to the free market in transactions among unrelated par-
ties. 10 When unmitigated double taxation occurs,11 the taxpayer or-
dinarily has recourse only to obtain agreement on its behalf between
the two countries' tax authorities. 12 In many cases, however, the
10. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 300-03 (illustrating market role in unrelated-party trans-
fers and transfer pricing'role in related-party transfers); Mary L. Dionne, Book Review, 55 TAx
NOTES 1279, 1279 (1992) (reviewing ERNST & YOUNG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRIC-
ING (1992)) (discussing I.R.C. § 482, which permits Secretary of Treasury to allocate income
earned by commonly controlled parties in transactions with one another, so as to reflect mar-
ket prices for similar transactions); see also Karen S. Cravens & HowellJ. Lynch,Jr., The Spanish
Inquisition: Transfer Pricing Implications of the Tax Court Decision in Procter & Gamble, 39 OIL &
GAS TAX Q. 380, 380-81 (1991) (suggesting that related entities may compete in ways that
shift disproportionate income to certain members of related group).
11. Double taxation is a natural consequence of multinational business operation. See
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4, at 67 (contending that
taxation of foreign-source income often results in double taxation); ORGANISATION FOR ECO-
NOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEV. COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTINA-
TIONAL ENTERPRISES: THREE TAXATION ISSUES 11 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 OECD REPORT]
(characterizing double taxation as ordinary occurrence in world of international business).
Lest the reader become alarmed, it is important to note that double taxation is the excep-
tion and not the rule. In the vast majority of cases involving both foreign and domestic in-
come, provisions built into national tax laws mitigate or eliminate double taxation. SeeJulie A.
Roin, The Grand Illusion: A Neutral System for the Taxation of International Transactions, 75 VA. L.
REV. 919, 923-26 (1989) (summarizing tax exemptions and tax credit mechanisms for alleviat-
ing double taxation); see also I.R.C. § 901 (1988) (codifying foreign tax credit). The most
common methods for alleviating double taxation are the tax exemption, whereby a country
exempts foreign-source income from its cumulative tax base, and the tax credit, which permits
a taxpayer to subtract income taxes paid in a foreign country from its domestic tax liability.
Roin, supra, at 923-24. A potential third method for alleviating double taxation would be to
permit the taxpayer a deduction from profits subject to tax in its country of domicile. See
J.D.R. ADAMS &J. WHALLEY, THE INTERNATIONAL TAXATION OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 46 (1977) (noting third method for alleviating double taxation, tax
deduction, which allows amount of foreign tax to be deducted from tax ba:;e of country in
question). Such a deduction scheme, however, probably would not provide the same benefits
offered by exemption and credit. lad; Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Treaty ofJune 16,
1981: Convention Between the United States ofAmerica andfor the Avoidance of Doubh! Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1
211, at 10,573, 10,577 [hereinafter U.S. Model Convention] (incorporating provisions of statu-
tory foreign income tax credit).
12. See infra notes 292-315, 333-47 and accompanying text (illustrating incorporation of
dispute resolution procedures into tax treaties). Most bilateral income tax treaties, as well as
a number of model double taxation conventions, provide bilateral means for resolving double
taxation. See Mogle, supra note 6, at 725 (noting that most U.S. income tax treaties and bilat-
eral tax treaties among OECD members, as well as model double taxation conventions
adopted by United Nations, provide means for eliminating double taxation); see also ORGANi-
SATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEV. COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL DOUBLE TAX-
ATION CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL art. 25, at 42 (1977) [hereinafter OECD
MODEL CONVENTION] (providing means, including competent authority procedure, for resolv-
ing double taxation disputes); U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECONOMICS & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, U.N. MODEL
DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES art. 25, at
40, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/102, U.N. Sales No. E.80.XVI.3 (1980) [hereinafter U.N. MODE.L CON-
VENTION] (utilizing competent authority procedures to resolve instances of double taxation);
U.S. Model Convention, supra note 11, art. 25, at 10,543 (providing mutual agreement procedure
for interpreting or applying bilateral tax agreements and avoiding problems such as double
taxation).
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means employed to settle such disputes may be cumbersome, overly
burdensome for the taxpayer, or may bear little or no binding effect
on future tax relations between the countries involved. 13
This Comment discusses the process of resolving double taxation
disputes in light of the issues relevant to transfer pricing. Part I
examines the international standard for determining appropriate
prices and for allocating the amount of income properly attributable
to cross-border dealings among related parties. This section also
illustrates instances that may lead to transfer pricing adjustments,
while discussing the history and application of the existing interna-
tional standard as articulated by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations, and the
United States. In addition, Part I explores the means by which the
United States has historically implemented the international stan-
dard, illustrating the general application of the international stan-
dard and highlighting some of the difficulties inherent in its
application. Part II discusses recent amendments to the principal
United States transfer pricing statute14 and the international reac-
tion to the regulations that have evolved under the statutory amend-
ment. This section includes analysis of the rationale underlying the
statutory amendment, the process through which the Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS) developed the new regulations, the new regula-
tions themselves, and the extent to which the new regulations'
proposed methodology may conflict with methods employed by tax
authorities in other nations. This discussion makes detailed refer-
ences to the particular problems associated with determining the
value of intangible property and the means by which the new rules
purport to standardize valuation methods specific to intangibles. Fi-
nally, Part III examines existing dispute resolution mechanisms as
well as the limitations of the international transfer pricing standard.
This section discusses the relative benefits of existing provisions for
competent authority proceedings, advance pricing agreements, and
limited arbitration, and explores the potential for binding interna-
tional arbitration that could unify international transfer pricing stan-
dards through bilateral and multilateral agreement.
I. THE ARM'S LENGTH STANDARD
Intracorporate transfers, or trade. among entities that share com-
13. See Dale W. Wickham & Charles J. Kerester, New Directions Needed for Solution of the
International Transfer Pricing Tax Puzzle: Internationally Agreed Rules or Tax Warfare?, 56 TAx NoTEs
339, 349 (1992) (contending that existing dispute resolution procedures are inadequate).
14. See I.R.C. § 482 (1988) (regulating intercompany transfer pricing allocations by Sec-
retary of Treasury).
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mon or centralized management, 15 are not inherently problematic.
Rather, they are a requisite to doing business within a multinational
corporate structure.1 6 These transfers, however, occur without the
benefit of a free market.' 7 Unrelated companies in competition with
each other trade goods and services at rates of consideration that
are set by market forces.' 8 In contrast, related companies that have
no need to compete with each other are not significantly affected by
the market. 19 A company that benefits, for example, from the in-
creased profitability of its subsidiary has little incentive to charge
that subsidiary a fair market price for goods, services, or intangible
property.20 If the parent company were to manipulate its transfer
prices so as to reduce its overall income tax exposure, its actions
may constitute tax avoidance and therefore detract from the reve-
nue base of a country in which it does business.21
The problem with intracorporate transfers becomes evident when
the transfers are made between related parties that are incorporated
in different countries and operate under different national tax
laws. 22 Most developed nations, the United States foremost among
15. See Cravens & Lynch, supra note 10, at 380 (noting that transfer pricing issues arise
with respect to divisions or profit centers within company or between affiliated companies).
16. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT COMM. ON FISCAL
AFFAIRS, TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 7 (1979) [hereinafter 1979
OECD REPORT] (observing that multinational enterprises engage in numerous intracorporate
transfers in ordinary course of business).
17. See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 7 (positing that intracorporate transfers are
not governed by same forces as transfers between unrelated parties); Kaplan, supra note 4, at
300 (asserting that free market has minimal effect on transactions between two parts of same
corporate taxpayer); cf. ADAM SMITH, SELECTIONS FROM The Wealth of Nations 38-47 (GeorgeJ.
Stigler ed., 1957) (explaining effects of free market externalities on sale price of marketed
goods).
18. A vendor ordinarily will seek the highest available price for its products, while a pur-
chaser will seek the lowest available price. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 300 (noting that free
market sets appropriate prices for unrelated-party transactions).
19. Kaplan, supra note 4, at 300. The IRS defines a related party, or "controlled tax-
payer," as "any one of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by the same interests." Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(g)(5), 58 Fed.
Reg. 5263, 5282 (1993). This element of control is determined by the relationship's operative
effect rather than by its form or mode of existence. Id § 1.482-1T(g)(4), 58 Fed. Reg. at
5282.
20. See Cravens & Lynch, supra note 10, at 381 (asserting that economic entities ordina-
rily strive to "buy low" and "sell high," but that related entities are not fully motivated to do
so).
21. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 301 (noting that multinational enterprises seek to mini-
mize global tax burdens by manipulating prices for goods, services, or other assets, resulting
in reduction of government's revenue base).
22. See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 7 (indicating that transfers between related
international entities create problems of conflicting national laws of countries in which enti-
ties operate). In a purely domestic context, intracorporate transfers generally amount to a
"zero sum game," wherein one party's gain will offset exactly the other's loss, and all income
attributable to the corporation will be taxed under the same national tax laws. Kaplan, supra
note 4, at 300. Although state, provincial, or local income tax laws differ in a domestic set-
ting, transfer pricing is not a major issue in those contexts because such tax differences are
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them, have addressed this problem by implementing comprehensive
transfer pricing rules that are intended to correct deviations from
market prices that may be evident in intracorporate transfers.23 In
essence, transfer pricing adjustments assign a "price," used only for
allocating taxable income, that most accurately reflects the amount
that the same transferor would have charged an unrelated third
party for the same goods or services. 24 Although national rules vary
widely in both scope and application,25 the international standard
for transfer pricing is that of arm's length, or the consideration that
would have been charged in the same transaction between unrelated
parties dealing at arm's length.26
Regardless of the specific rule applied, the intent of transfer pric-
ing is to ensure that taxable income is kept within reach of a nation's
comparatively small. Kaplan, supra note 4, at 300 n.6; see also Edwards v. Commissioner, 67
T.C. 224, 224 (1976), acq., 1977-2 C.B. 2 (addressing tax conflicts caused by transactions
between commonly held corporation and partnership that were operating under different tax
rates); Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 341-42 (summarizing U.S. legal mechanisms
aimed at eliminating domestic disputes involving related-party transfers); infra notes 101-08
and accompanying text (discussing Edwards). In an international context, however, intracor-
porate transfers take on greater tax significance. For example, a transfer of goods made by a
U.S. corporation to a foreign subsidiary for no consideration would decrease that corpora-
tion's reported U.S. income while increasing the income reported by the subsidiary. If the
subsidiary were located in a country with lower corporate income tax rates than the United
States, the corporation would avoid a portion of its cumulative tax liability. See infra notes 40-
58 and accompanying text (defining taxation problem arising from international intracorpo-
rate transfers and summarizing hypothetical tax-avoiding transfers among related parties).
23. See U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, TAX TREArIEs BETWEEN DEVELOPED
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES at 62, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/79, U.N. Sales No. E.78.XVI.1 (1978)
[hereinafter U.N. TAx TREATIES] (discussing international transfer pricing legislation and not-
ing U.N. special committee's conclusion in 1974 that transfer pricing legislation was particu-
larly advanced in United States); CROSs-BORDER TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN RELATED
COMPANIES: A SUMMARY OF TAx RULES 283-301 (William R. Lawlor ed., 1985) [hereinafter
CROss-BORDER TRANSACTIONS] (summarizing transfer pricing rules of industrialized nations).
24. See Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 342 (observing that transfer pricing adjust-
ment is based on hypothetical "price" to which unrelated parties would agree).
25. See CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS, supra note 23, at 283-301 (highlighting features of
various national tax rules).
26. See, e.g., Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-IT(b)(1), 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5272 (1993) ("A
controlled transaction meets the arm's length standard if the results of that transaction are
consistent with the results that would have been realized if uncontrolled taxpayers had en-
gaged in a comparable transaction under comparable circumstances."); OECD MODEL CON-
VENTION, supra note 12, art. 9, at 30 (providing arm's length standard as means for contracting
states to convention to reallocate profits among associated enterprises for tax purposes); U.N.
MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 9, at 27 (including as taxable profits those profits that
would have accrued from transactions had they been made between independent enterprises);
see also 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 7 (explaining that arm's length standard corre-
sponds to prices charged in transactions among unrelated parties); CROSS-BORDER TRANSAC-
TIONS, supra note 23, at 284 (illustrating that 24 of 25 industrialized nations have adopted
arm's length standard for determining transfer prices); U.N. TAX TREATIES, supra note 23, at
62 (claiming unanimous international agreement on arm's length standard); Rom Watson,
New Developments, in TAx ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF INFORMATION 75, 76 (David W.
Williams ed., 1991) (noting that United States has uniformly adopted arm's length standard in
bilateral income tax treaties and model treaties).
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fisc. 27 Although transfer pricing regulations operate by allocating
income earned among related segments of multinational entities,
their purpose has less to do with distributing multinational taxpay-
ers' income than with distributing tax revenue among the nations in
which those taxpayers do business. 28 While a national revenue au-
thority bears considerable responsibility for enforcing its own tax
laws, it must also contend with the possibility that another nation's
tax laws may conflict with its own, thereby competing for a common
revenue pool. 29 Furthermore, while a country must prevent un-
dertaxation of income earned within its jurisdiction, it must also
prevent the overtaxation of its taxpayers by the operation of other
countries' transfer pricing laws.30
The problems associated with competing tax jurisdictions create
the greatest obstacles to establishing fair and uniform international
transfer pricing standards.3 ' Although the OECD, United Nations,
and United States have adopted model conventions that address
transfer pricing adjustments,3 2 and although the standards set forth
therein have received nearly unanimous international support,33 the
application of the arm's length standard imposes many difficulties. 34
For instance, the prospect of applying a fixed price to a transaction
that unrelated parties do not ordinarily undertake or that involves
unique (and therefore unpriceable) goods, services, or intangible
property is daunting to say the least.3 5
Where tax authorities of two or more countries have an interest in
the income of the same enterprise but apply different standards for
27. See Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 341-43 (stating that intent of every gov-
ernment in implementing transfer pricing rules is to avoid losses of legitimate tax revenues).
28. See Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 343 (recognizing that one purpose of
transfer pricing is geographic sourcing of income to allocate tax revenue among competing
nations).
29. See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 8 (suggesting that one nation's aggressive
taxation of foreign-derived income may harm other involved nation's tax base).
30. See Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 341 (stating that purposes of transfer pric-
ing regulations are to protect national fisc, to ensure that foreign businesses do not obtain
unfair tax advantages, and to prevent nationals from paying discriminatory foreign taxes).
31. See Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 343 (characterizing existing international
standard as biased toward unilateral tax enforcement rather than mutual agreement).
32. OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 9, at 30; U.N. MODEL CONVENTION,
supra note 12, art. 9, at 27; U.S. Model Convention, supra note 11, art. 9, at 10,577.
33. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (documenting international acceptance of
arm's length standard).
34. See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 13-22 (setting forth problems encountered
in applying conventional transfer pricing methodologies); see also Stanley I. Lsangbein, The Uni-
tary Method and the Myth of Ann's Length, 30 TAx NoTEs 625, 625-29 (1986) (suggesting that
arm's length standard should not restrict governments' ability to employ any appropriate
transfer pricing allocation method).
35. See David W. Williams, Introduction to TAX ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF INFOR-
MATION 1, 1-2 (David W. Williams ed., 1991) (illustrating difficulty of valuing property with
example of IBM's purchase of rights to first programmable computer for only £50,000).
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determining arm's length prices and therefore make different ad-
justments to the same transactions, those countries will assign dif-
ferent tax liabilities to those transactions.3 6 Consequently, the
multinational enterprise involved in such a transaction may be taxed
twice.3 7 To resolve this double taxation problem, the U.N. Model
Convention and the OECD Model Convention provide dispute reso-
lution procedures.38 The fact that double taxation still occurs, how-
ever, indicates the need for more effective dispute resolution
methods, or more importantly, a revised international standard.3 9
A. The Problem Defined
In a 1979 report, the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs stated
that the phenomenon of related companies operating in concert
under some form of central management, but under different na-
tional tax laws, naturally gives rise to problems in taxing corporate
profits. 40 Although that observation was not new, the increase in
the number and influence of multinational corporations in recent
decades 41 has made transfer pricing an increasingly relevant con-
cern for tax authorities, which in some cases are dissatisfied with the
efficacy of the traditional arm's length standard.42
Although transfer pricing questions arise in many different con-
texts, a few hypotheticals are helpful in understanding the general
problem.43 The following hypotheticals illustrate situations that
may be referred to as income expatriation, income repatriation, and round-
trip transfers.44 For simplicity, each example assumes that the inter-
36. See 1984 OECD REPORT, supra note 11, at 9 (introducing concept of "corresponding
adjustments," or modifications made by tax authorities of different nations with regard to
single transaction).
37. See 1984 OECD REPORT, supra note 11, at 11 (recognizing double taxation as natural
consequence of unilateral transfer pricing adjustments).
38. See OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 25, at 42 (establishing competent
authority negotiations as means to reach mutual agreements); U.N. MODEL CONVENTION, supra
note 12, art. 25, at 40 (providing competent authority procedures as dispute resolution
means).
39. See infra notes 292-347 and accompanying text (discussing existing and proposed
means for avoiding and resolving double taxation).
40. 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 7.
41. See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 7 (observing increasing role of multina-
tional economic entities in global affairs).
42. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 423-24 (1985) (noting "questioned
... effectiveness" of arm's length standard and highlighting difficulty in determining whether
transactions meet standard).
43. The first of the following hypotheticals has been adapted from Kaplan, supra note 4,
at 301-03. The remaining hypotheticals have been constructed by the author, with reference
to the sources noted.
44. See 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5264 (1993) (comments to temporary regulations) (discussing
round-trip transactions). The terms "income expatriation" and "income repatriation" are the
author's.
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ested tax authority is the IRS.
1. Expatriating income to a foreign affiliate
In the first example, a U.S. corporation, X, manufactures a prod-
uct, which sells for a wholesale price of $10, at a unit cost of $2.
The corporation ordinarily would sell the product to its distributors
for $10, thereby earning taxable income of $8 for each item sold.
Rather than sell the product on its own and be subject to income tax
on all of its $8 profit, however, X sells to a wholly owned foreign
subsidiary at a price of $4 per unit. The subsidiary then merely dis-
tributes the product at the unit price of $10. 4 5
The result of this hypothetical is that X realizes a net profit of $2
per unit sold, while its foreign subsidiary realizes a profit of $6 per
unit. Because the subsidiary is wholly owned by X, its parent's bal-
ance sheet will reflect its profits, meaning that X has realized an ac-
tual profit of $8 per unit-the same as if it had sold the product on
its own.46 Under this distribution scheme, therefore, X has diverted
75% of its income to a foreign tax jurisdiction. If that jurisdiction
assesses a lower corporate tax rate than the United States, X has
successfully avoided a significant portion of its cumulative tax
burden.47
2. Repatriating income to a foreign parent
In the second hypothetical, a foreign parent corporation main-
tains a wholly owned manufacturing subsidiary, or "screwdriver
plant,' ' 48 and supplies this subsidiary with component parts for the
sole purpose of assembling the finished product. Assuming that the
parent corporation is located in a favorable tax jurisdiction,49 the
following occurs: rather than sell component parts to the subsidiary
at market or below-market prices, as in the previous hypothetical,
45. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 301-03 (offering hypothetical and discussing income
expatriation).
46. Kaplan, supra note 4, at 302.
47. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 302 (noting that parent company will have incentive to
arrange income transfer scheme where there is large difference between tax rates in two coun-
tries). More often than not, the incentive to enter this tax avoidance scheme is provided by
favorable corporate income tax rates in the country where the subsidiary is located. Cravens
& Lynch, supra note 10, at 382. For example, if in the above hypothetical the country in which
the subsidiary does business has no corporate income tax, X will have avoided 757o of its tax
liability.
48. See U.S., Others Blame ECfor Failure in Brussels to Agree on New Rules To Govern lWorld
Trade, July-Dec.] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1876, 1879 (Dec. 12, 1990) (defining and
discussing "screwdriver plant" as nonintegrated product assembly plant that foreign manu-
facturer establishes in importing country).
49. Cf Kaplan, supra note 4, at 302 (discussing hypothetical involving sales to subsidiary
located in country that imposes no income tax).
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the parent "sells" component parts to its subsidiary at prices so in-
flated that in spite of the subsidiary's success at producing and mar-
keting its product, the subsidiary earns less than expected or even
loses money.50 By overcharging for the parts, the parent has in ef-
fect repatriated its earnings before they were earned and thus has
avoided generating income, or income tax liability, within the
United States. 5 1
3. Round-trip transfers of intangible property
In the third example, the property transferred is not components
or finished products, but an intangible such as intellectual prop-
erty.52 In this case, a U.S. parent company licenses the intangible to
its foreign subsidiary, which uses the intangible to manufacture a
product.53 The subsidiary then sells the product back to the parent
company or to other affiliates, or markets the product
independently. 54
This hypothetical differs from the previous two in several key re-
spects. First, the subsidiary has not taken advantage of material
value that its parent has added to a finished product. Rather, it has
employed only the intangible provided to it by the parent. Second,
in selling the product back to the parent company or to another af-
filiate, the subsidiary need only charge an appropriate market
price. 55 As far as the IRS is concerned, the operative segment of the
50. See, e.g., Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2176,
2176-77 (1992) (acknowledging IRS assertion that petitioner's low operating income was due
to non-ann's length purchases of components from foreign parent); Alan F. Holmer et al.,
U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 17: Steering Clear of the Scylla of the U.S. Antidumping Law and
the Charybdis of Internal Revenue Code Section 482, 24 Irr'L LAW. 1099, 1102 (1990) (discussing
IRS authority to adjust prices where foreign company has overcharged U.S. affiliate).
51. Such a scheme has been the subject of IRS investigations into Japanese automobile
manufacturers' dealings with their U.S. subsidiaries. John H. Fisher, Comment, LR.C. Section
482-Applying the Arm's Length Standard to Transactions Between Foreign Car Manufacturers and Their
United States Subsidiaries, 4 WIs. IN'T'L LJ. 134, 148-49 (1985); see also United States v. Toyota
Motor Corp., 561 F. Supp. 354, 358 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (reasoning that § 482 permits adjust-
ment ofU.S. subsidiary's income where income had flowed from subsidiary to foreign parent);
Yamaha Motor Corp., 63 T.C.M. (CCH), at 2178 (noting IRS's authority to allocate income
under § 482 to U.S. subsidiary with foreign parent).
52. See 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5264 (1993) (comments to temporary regulations) (explaining
"round-trip" transaction as "integrated series of controlled transactions" involving intangible
property).
53. Id. This hypothetical assumes that the subsidiary has provided or otherwise paid
market rates for all raw materials, equipment, and other manufacturing costs involved in pro-
ducing the finished product.
54. Id.
55. The reader should note that if the subsidiary sold the product to its U.S. parent at a
price below market rate, thereby inverting the first hypothetical discussed above, the non-
arm's length resale would increase the parent's U.S. income and potentially expose the com-
pany to a transfer price allocation by the subsidiary's country of residence. See supra notes 22-
39 and accompanying text (explaining application of transfer pricing adjustment to transac-
tions carried on between related parties).
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transaction is the initial license to the subsidiary, and any pricing
adjustment must accordingly reflect a royalty that might properly be
charged for the license. 56 Finally and most importantly, the parties
may not have known the ultimate value of the intangible at the time
of transfer. Unlike the first two hypotheticals, which involved trans-
fers of tangible goods for which market prices may be available, the
value of a newly developed patent is generally speculative. 57 It is
this type of transaction and the extraordinary valuation problems
associated with it that led Congress to address the subject of con-
trolled transfers of intangibles in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.58
B. The History of the Arm's Length Standard
In 1921, Congress permitted the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue to require consolidated tax returns from affiliated domestic cor-
porations if necessary to determine a taxpayer's total taxable
income.59 Congress did not directly address the question of tax eva-
sion through related-party transfers until it passed the Revenue Act
of 1928,60 which permitted the Commissioner to allocate or appor-
tion the incomes of related entities to reflect their true tax liabili-
ties.61 The legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1928 evidences
clear congressional intent to discourage tax evasion through intra-
corporate transfers, 62 and the language of section 45 of the Act has
survived with only cosmetic changes as the first sentence of § 482 of
56. See I.R.C. § 482 (1988) (requiring that price or royalty charged in controlled transac-
tion correspond to income ultimately realized from exploitation of intangible).
57. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 42, at 424 (discussing problem of valuing intangi-
ble property and asserting need for periodic review of realized profits and comparison to
original price charged); Williams, supra note 35, at 1-2 (noting difficulty of valuing knowledge
or intelligence and fact that parties may not even be aware of intangible property's transfer).
58. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1231 (e)(l), 100 Stat. 2085, 2562-
63 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 482 (1988)) (providing valuation standard for controlled transac-
tions involving intangible property); H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 42, at 424 (reporting con-
gressional concern that transferors of promising intangibles might charge low price for initial
transfer and feign ignorance of intangible's profit potential).
59. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 260 (authorizing Commissioner of
IRS to "consolidate the accounts of such related trades and businesses ... for the purpose of
making an accurate distribution or apportionment of gains, profits, income, deductions, or
capital between or among such related trades or businesses"); see also A Study of Intercom-
pany Pricing Under Section 482 of the Code, I.R.S. Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458, 459
[hereinafter White Paper] (tracing history of transfer pricing law and noting that income tax
statutes dating back to 1917 indirectly related to income allocation between affiliated
corporations).
60. Ch. 852, 45 Stat. 791 (1928).
61. Id. § 45, 45 Stat. at 806.
62. See H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1927) (declaring that intent of
provision was to "prevent evasion (by shifting of profits, the making of fictitious sales, and
other methods frequently adopted for the purpose of 'milking'), and in order clearly to reflect
-.. true tax liability").
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the current Internal Revenue Code.63
In 1963, as Congress first became concerned with the transfer
pricing problems associated with multinationals, 4 the OECD articu-
lated an international transfer pricing standard in article 9 of a draft
model convention on double taxation. 65 Despite a fair amount of
commentary on the transfer pricing standard,66 the OECD did not
formally adopt the draft text until 1977.67 Three years later the
63. Congress altered the language slightly (but not substantively) and changed the sec-
tion number to 482 in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 482, 68A Stat. 3, 162
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 482 (1988)). The regulations issued in 1935 under sec-
tion 45, Treas. Reg. 86, § 45-1(b) (1935), remained unaltered until 1968, when the Treasury
Department amended the regulations to address transfers among multinational enterprises in
a more complete fashion. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 460 (discussing history of § 482
and regulatory amendments in 1960s); see also infra notes 130-53 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing evolution of "commensurate with income" standard).
64. See H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-30 (1962) (recognizing transfer
pricing problems and discussing proposed amendments to § 482 in Revenue Act of 1962).
Although the version of the Revenue Act of 1962 that was offered by the House of Represent-
atives, H.R. 10,650, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), proposed extensive amendments to § 482,
the conference committee determined that none of the proposals would enlarge the Commis-
sioner's existing authority. H.R. REP. No. 1447, supra, at 28-30. The conference committee
therefore called on the Treasury Department to amend its regulations instead. H.R. REP. No.
2508, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1962).
65. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEv. COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS,
OECD DRAFT DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL 13 (1963) [hereinafter
1963 CONVENTION]; see 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 10 n.1 (noting that article 9 was
carried from 1963 Convention to OECD Model Convention without change); U.N. MODEL
CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 9, at 27 (reproducing article 9 of OECD Model Convention).
Article 9 provides:
1. Where:
(a) An enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the
management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State, or
(b) The same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control
or capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other Con-
tracting State, and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the two
enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which
would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but
for those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that
enterprise and taxed accordingly.
2. Where a Contracting State includes in the profits of an enterprise of that State-
and taxes accordingly-profits on which an enterprise of the other Contracting State
has been charged to tax in that other State and the profits so included are profits
which would have accrued to the enterprise of the first-mentioned State if the condi-
tions made between the two enterprises had been those which would have been
made between independent enterprises, then that other State shall make an appro-
priate adjustment to the amount of the tax charged therein on those profits. In de-
termining such adjustment, due regard shall be had to the other provisions of the
Convention and the competent authorities of the Contracting States shall, if neces-
sary, consult each other.
1963 CONVENTION, supra, art. 9, at 13; OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 9, at 30;
U.N. MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 9, at 27.
66. See, e.g., U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, THE IMPACT OF THE MULTINA-
TIONAL CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT AND ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS at 89, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESA/6, U.N. Sales No. E.74.II.A.5 (1974) (noting attention given to transfer pricing by
United Nations, OECD, and Commission of European Communities).
67. See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 10 n.1 (noting that article 9 was carried
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United Nations likewise adopted a model convention on double
taxation.68
Although the model conventions adopted by the OECD and the
United Nations employ identical language in addressing related-
party transactions, 69 and although both endorse the arm's length
standard,70 neither prescribes empirical methods for determining an
arm's length price.71 Practical methods for calculating an arm's
length price had already been implemented in the United States,
however, by amendments in 1968 to the Treasury regulations under
§ 482.72
C. Adjusting Income Under the Arm's Length Standard
In theory, applying the arm's length standard is relatively easy.
without change from 1963 Convention to OECD Model Convention where it was adopted in
1977).
68. U.N. MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, at 19.
69. See U.N. MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 9 cmt., at 105-06 (explaining that
OECD Model Convention and U.N. Model Convention use identical language in article 9).
70. OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 9 & cmt., para. 1, at 30, 88; U.N.
MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 9 & cmt., at 27, 105-06.
71. See OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 9 & cmt., para. 4, at 30, 88 (ex-
plaining that article 9(2) does not indicate how pricing adjustment is to be made); U.N.
MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 9 & cmt., para. 2, at 27, 107-08 (adopting language of
OECD Convention commentary, which observes that convention does not supply particular
method for making pricing adjustments).
72. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1 to -2 (as amended in 1968 and 1988) (explaining calcula-
tion of arm's length prices in specific situations such as loans, performance of services, use of
tangible property, transfer or use of intangible property, and sales of tangible property). Not
surprisingly, the United States expressed reservations on article 9 of the OECD Model Con-
vention, suggesting that the article should apply to all related persons, rather than simply
"enterprises" of contracting states, and to "income, deductions, credits, or allowances,"
rather than merely "profits." See OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 9 cmt., para.
12, at 90 (reporting concerns of United States regarding article 9). The United States reserva-
tion helps to account for one of the Model Convention's primary weaknesses. The problem of
transfer pricing does not occur only between treaty partners. A national tax authority, there-
fore, should be permitted to adjust income among any related entities over which it has juris-
diction, regardless of their location, because doing so is in the interest of preserving the
national tax base. Accordingly, the language that article 9 of the U.S. Model Convention adds
to the OECD Model Convention closely resembles the language of § 482 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code:
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not limit any provisions of the law of either
Contracting State which permit the distribution, apportionment, or allocation of in-
come, deductions, credits, or allowances between persons, whether or not residents
of a Contracting State, owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same inter-
ests when necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the
income of any of such persons.
U.S. Model Convention, supra note 11, art. 9, at 10,577.
Transfer pricing policy does not merely address corporate profits. A thorough and precise
calculation of corporate income (as opposed to profits per se) instead requires inquiry into
many aspects of intracorporate transactions. See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 17-19
(noting that general considerations for determining arm's length price include, among other
things, analysis of entities' functions, existence of "set-offs" or payments through according
some benefit to entity in transaction, and recognition of actual payments to entity in
transaction).
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Prices charged among related parties simply must be adjusted to re-
flect arm's length prices, which are defined as prices that unrelated
parties charge each other in the market.73 In practice, however, this
apparent simplicity disappears. To determine market rates for
property transfers, the property in question must be substantially
similar or comparable to property commonly traded among unre-
lated parties. 74 Where transfers defy definition by the market, as do
transfers involving proprietary goods or valuable intellectual prop-
erty that would not ordinarily be the subject of a transaction among
unrelated parties, a tax authority must turn to alternative methods
for establishing their value.7 5 The principal pricing methods that
tax authorities use, in an order determined by a transaction's rela-
tive comparability to a third-party transaction, 76 are the comparable
uncontrolled price, 77 resale price, 78 and cost plus methods. 79
1. Comparable uncontrolled price
In any tax system that relies on the arm's length standard, the
preferred method to determine a transfer price adjustment is to
compare a related-party transaction with a substantially identical
transaction between unrelated parties.80 Ideally, a related-party
transaction will substantially, if not exactly, resemble a similar trans-
action between unrelated parties. In such a situation, the "compara-
ble uncontrolled price" method for determining the appropriate
73. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-IT(b)(1), 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5272 (1993) ("In deter-
mining the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer, the standard to be applied in every
case is that of a taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer.").
74. See Charles H. Berry et al., Arm's-Length Pricing: Some Economic Perspectives, 54 TAx
Noas 731, 733 & n.6 (1992) (recognizing that in determining transfer price, issue is whether
property is sufficiently similar so that adjustments for differences may be made).
75. See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 13 (noting that certain types of property
are so special that there may be no market for them outside related-party group). In situa-
tions involving special property, arm's length prices may be determined by using the cost plus
method or the resale price method. Id. at 14; see infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text
(discussing cost plus and resale price methods).
76. But see 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5265 (1993) (comments to temporary regulations) (ob-
serving that temporary regulations abandon priority of valuation methods in favor of "best
method" rule); see also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(b)(2)(iii)(A), 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5273
(1993) (setting forth operation of best method rule).
77. See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 13 (defining "comparable uncontrolled
price" method as requiring comparison to prices in similar transaction between independent
parties or between group enterprise and unrelated parties); see also infra notes 80-89 and ac-
companying text (discussing comparable uncontrolled price method).
78. See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 13-14 (explaining resale price method as
subtracting cost and appropriate profit markup from final price at time of sale); see also infra
notes 90-98 and accompanying text (discussing resale price method).
79. See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 13-14 (explaining cost plus method as
adding appropriate costs and profit markup to cost of providing goods and services); see also
infra notes 99-108 (discussing cost plus method).
80. See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 13 (referring to comparable uncontrolled
price method as the "most appropriate to use and in theory the easiest").
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arm's length price merely involves comparing the price charged in
the related parties' transaction to prices charged in similar transac-
tions between independent parties or between the group enterprise
and unrelated parties.81
Not every related-party transaction, however, bears a reasonable
resemblance to transactions occurring in the market. Even appar-
ently identical third-party transactions may not meet the arm's
length standard under the comparable uncontrolled price method. 82
For example, in the case of United States Steel Corp. v. Commissioner,83
the Tax Court examined the relationship between a U.S. corpora-
tion and its foreign shipping subsidiary, which provided transport
for iron ore supplied by a second foreign subsidiary.8 4 Despite the
fact that the shipping subsidiary charged third-party purchasers of
foreign ore the same rate that it charged the parent,8 5 the court did
not agree that the third-party transactions adequately reflected mar-
ket rates.8 6 United States Steel therefore raises the difficult problem of
defining the phrase "comparable uncontrolled transaction. ' 8 7 At a
minimum, the Tax Court's decision in the case, when considered
together with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's
reversal,88 indicates that even where identical third-party transac-
81. 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 13; see Paccar, Inc. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C.
754, 791-92 (1985) (illustrating application of comparable uncontrolled price method), acq.,
1987-2 C.B. 1, aff'd, 849 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1988); Fisher, supra note 51, at 140-42 (discussing
application of comparable uncontrolled price method under former regulations).
82. See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 13 (recognizing that some transactions are
difficult to compare because they involve special property that has no market beyond related
party).
83. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 586 (1977), rev'd, 617 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1980).
84. United States Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 36T.C.M. (CCH) 586, 588 (1977), rev'd,
617 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1980). The IRS concluded that the shipping subsidiary was charging
inflated rates and allocated 25% of the transportation charges paid by U.S. Steel to the sub-
sidiary. Id. at 605.
85. Id. at 588.
86. Id at 602-03 (asserting that independent purchaser of ore could obtain lower ship-
ping rate).
87. See Gale Mosteller, Comparability in the U.S. Steel Transfer Pricing Case, 55 TAX NoTEs
1251, 1253 (1992) (noting that regulations provide little guidance for identifying comparable
transactions).
88. United States Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 617 F.2d 942, 954 (2d Cir. 1980). The
appellate court reversed the tax court's decision because it found sufficient evidence to prove
that the price the producer paid was arm's length. Id. at 947. The appellate court found that
the shipping subsidiary charged U.S. Steel approximately the same price that it charged unre-
lated parties for similar transactions. Id Therefore, the court did not reallocate income to
U.S. Steel's subsidiary under § 482. Id.
Some analysts, however, assert that the Second Circuit was incorrect. See, e.g., Mosteller,
supra note 87, at 1254 (asserting that Second Circuit decision was wrong because it rejected
"analyzing the context of the transaction [such as buyer's alternatives] when it indicated that
the key issues were whether the transactions involved similar services and whether the trans-
actions were independent"). But see Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 525, 590
(1989) (following Second Circuit's analysis of comparable uncontrolled prices and aban-
doning its earlier approach in United States Steel), aft'd, 933 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1991).
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tions exist, the circumstances of those transactions must be sub-
jected to complex judicial scrutiny and might not serve properly as
comparable uncontrolled transactions. 89
2. Resale pice
Where comparable uncontrolled prices are not available, the
next-favored technique for determining an adjustment is the resale
price method. 90 This method requires ascertaining a market-based
resale price91 and subtracting an appropriate profit to obtain a rea-
sonable arm's length price.92 The steps involved in determining a
proper transfer price under this method reveal that the resale price
89. See Mosteller, supra note 87, at 1254 (suggesting that reviewing suitability of compa-
rable uncontrolled transactions requires analysis of at least: "(1) the product or service and
the terms of the transaction; (2) the buyer's alternatives; and (3) the seller's alternatives"); see
also United States Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 586, 603 (1977) (reducing
analysis to similar three-part inquiry), rev'd, 617 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1980).
Acknowledging that the single largest unrelated purchaser of Venezuelan ore from U.S.
Steel's subsidiary had arranged its own transportation, presumably at a lower rate than that
offered by U.S. Steel's shipping subsidiary, United States Steel, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 602, and
that U.S. Steel could have contracted cheaper shipping by dealing with unrelated shipping
contractors, id. at 604, the Tax Court concluded that the subsidiary charged its parent, U.S.
Steel, higher rates thin it would have charged an unrelated party for similar services. Id. at
602-04. After calculating factors specific to the shipping arrangement, the court found that
the subsidiary had in fact overcharged U.S. Steel, and it adjusted U.S. Steel's income accord-
ingly. Id. at 586, 605.
90. See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 13-14 (acknowledging that resale price
method is used if comparable uncontrolled prices are not available or impracticable to deter-
mine); Fisher, supra note 51, at 142 (noting that resale price method is next-favored technique
for determining arm's length price after comparable uncontrolled sales method and asserting
that resale price method cannot be used to determine appropriate tax allocation if comparable
uncontrolled sales are available); see also Paccar, Inc. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 754, 788-90
(1985) (discussing relative priority of resale price method), acq., 1987-2 C.B. 1, aft'd, 849 F.2d
393 (7th Cir. 1988). But see 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5265 (1993) (comments to temporary regula-
tions) (discussing temporary regulations' abandonment of strict priority of methods); Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(b)(2)(iii)(A), 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5273 (1993) (explaining best method
rule).
91. SeeTemp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3T(c)(2)(ii), 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5283 (1993) (defining
applicable resale price as either resale price of property to unrelated party or contemporane-
ous resale price of same property). Under the 1968 regulations, the method applied only if
there were no comparable uncontrolled prices, an appropriate resale price could be ascer-
tained, and the reseller had not added significant value to the product before reselling it.
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1988); see also Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 92 T.C. 525, 586-87 (1989) (acknowledging regulatory requirements for applying re-
sale price method), aft'd, 933 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1991).
92. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § IA82-3T(c)(2)(iii), 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5283-84 (1993) (ex-
plaining calculations of appropriate gross profit). Accurate administration of the resale price
method also requires incorporation of any adjustments necessary to reflect material differ-
ences in the terms of the uncontrolled resales referred to in calculating the appropriate resale
price and the terms of the resale in the controlled transaction. See id. § 1.482-3T(c)(3)(ii), (4),
58 Fed. Reg. at 5284 (requiring adjustment to account for material differences between con-
trolled and uncontrolled transactions and providing example of adjustment where related
party warranted resold products but unrelated party did not); see also E.I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. United States, 608 F.2d 445, 449-54 (1979) (discussing application of resale price
method), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 962 (1980); Paccar, 85 T.C. at 790, 792-98 (discussing resale
price method).
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method merely constructs an arm's length price where a transaction
ordinarily might not occur between unrelated parties.93 As applied
by the Treasury regulations, the appropriate resale price is either
the price at which resales of the same property are made between
unrelated parties, or the final resale price of the property in ques-
tion.94 In addition, application of an "appropriate markup" re-
quires comparison to the profit ratio realized on resales of similar
property that is the subject of transactions among unrelated
parties.95
Accordingly, any application of the resale price method must
make reference to comparable transactions undertaken by unrelated
parties.96 To serve the needs of the methodology, appropriate com-
parable resales by unrelated parties must be sufficiently similar to
those made by the related parties so that any substantive differences
between the compared transactions may be accounted for accu-
rately. 97 Absent these circumstances, the resale price method ordi-
narily does not apply.98
3. Cost plus
The third method, cost plus, applies to transactions in which a
controlled transferee adds value to goods before reselling them.99
Determination of a transfer price by the cost plus method involves
93. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3T(c)(2)(i), 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5283 (1993) (explain-
ing procedure for determining arm's length price under resale price method, which involves
subtracting appropriate gross profit from appropriate resale price in transaction among re-
lated parties); see also id. § 1.482-3T(b), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5282 (noting that existence of compa-
rable transaction between unrelated parties permits application of comparable uncontrolled
price method).
94. Id. § 1.482-3T(c)(2)(ii), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5283.
95. Id. § 1.482-3T(c)(2)(iii), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5283-84; see E.L Du Pont, 608 F.2d at 450-54
(discussing derivation of appropriate resale price markup from similar transactions involving
unrelated parties).
96. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § IA82-3T(c)(2)(iii), 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5283-84 (1993) (re-
quiring that gross profit margins used to determine appropriate resale price be derived from
comparable uncontrolled sale); see also E.I. Du Pont, 608 F.2d at 451-54 (finding no compara-
ble unrelated-party transaction to justify application of resale price method).
97. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(c)(2)(i), 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5274 (1993) (provid-
ing that functional comparability does not require identical controlled and uncontrolled
transactions, but rather that uncontrolled transaction provide "a reasonable and reliable
benchmark" for determining arm's length price); id. § IA82-3T(c)(3)(ii), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5284
(requiring "appropriate adjustments" in calculating profit margins to account for differences
between controlled and uncontrolled transactions); see also Woodward Governor Co. v. Com-
missioner, 55 T.C. 56, 65 (1970), acq., 1971-2 C.B. 3 (asserting that resale price method ap-
plies only with reference to uncontrolled purchases and resales by same or similar reseller).
98. Cf Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(b)(2)(iii)(A), 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5273 (1993) (re-
quiring application of valuation method that yields most accurate result).
99. See id. § IA82-3T(d)(I), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5285 (stating that cost plus method deter-
mines arm's length price by considering profit markup and providing that method ordinarily
applies "in cases involving the manufacture, assembly, or other production of goods that are
sold to related parties"). See generally 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 13-14 (describing
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adding the reasonable cost of production to an amount computed
by multiplying the production cost by an appropriate gross profit
markup.' 0 0 For example, in Edwards v. Commissioner'0' the Tax
Court examined a relationship between a partnership and a corpo-
ration that shared common owners. 10 2 The Government contended
that the partnership had made sales of construction equipment to
the corporation at less than market prices. 10 3 After quickly dis-
missing the comparable uncontrolled price10 4 and resale price' 0 5
methods, the court turned to the cost plus method.' 06 The court's
analysis focused on constructing an appropriate gross profit per-
centage.' 0 7 In rejecting the Government's valuation of the trans-
fers, the court asserted that the best indicator for a gross profit
percentage would be the profits realized by the partnership in sales
to unrelated parties.' 08
4. "Other methods" and the problem of intangible property
Unfortunately, controlled transactions frequently occur that defy
application of cost plus method); Fisher, supra note 51, at 144-46 (discussing calculation of
arm's length prices under cost plus method).
100. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1A82-3T(d)(2)(i), 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5285 (1993). An "appro-
priate gross profit markup is equal to the gross profit earned in comparable uncontrolled
transactions, expressed as a percentage of cost." Id. § 1.482-3T(d)(2)(ii), 58 Fed. Reg. at
5285-86.
101. 67 T.C. 224 (1976), acq., 1977-2 C.B. 2.
102. Edwards v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 224, 229 (1976), acq., 1977-2 C.B. 2. Although
both entities were organized and operated entirely within the United States, the case provides
an excellent illustration of the cost plus method.
103. Id. at 226-27 (charting equipment sold and sale prices involved in sales to corpora-
tion against prices charged in sales to unrelated parties and manufacturer's list prices for
equipment). The IRS had allocated to the partnership the difference between the profit it
would have realized had it charged market prices and the profit it actually reported. Id. at
229-30. The basis for the IRS income estimate was a gross profit percentage calculated with
reference to third-party prices charged in sales of similar equipment that were reported by
members of a trade organization, as well as the manufacturer's list prices for the equipment.
Id at 236.
104. Ia at 234 (citing lack of data reflecting sales to unrelated parties and lack of informa-
tion on what adjustments were needed to reflect different properties and circumstances).
105. Id (observing that corporation did not resell equipment).
106. See id at 234-35 (addressing IRS application of cost plus method in determining orig-
inal income allocation and holding that whenever possible, gross profit percentages should
derive from uncontrolled sales of selling party rather than uncontrolled sales of third parties).
107. See id. at 236 (deciding to compute accurate average instead of relying on respon-
dent's survey).
108. Id at 236. The court rejected the IRS's gross profit percentage calculation because
the survey from which the IRS had purported to derive standard prices charged by other
companies did not necessarily provide a representative sample of the prices charged by all
members of the industry. Id. The court suggested further that the IRS data provided no
proof that the survey's "industry norm" bore any direct relation to the transactions in which
the partnership had engaged. Id Finally, the court rejected the use of manufacturers' list
prices because they did not control the prices charged by the partnership or any other dealer.
Id
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definition by one of the three methods. 10 9 Transfer pricing meth-
ods that can adequately accommodate such circumstances, such as
those where a transaction involves unique intangible property that is
used to produce a unique product, thus far have eluded interna-
tional consensus. Generally such transactions may be priced only
on a tortuous case-by-case basis. 10 Despite the difficulty involved
in applying such case-specific methods, which the IRS refers to col-
lectively as "fourth methods,"' the General Accounting Office has
reported that the IRS applies "fourth method analysis" twice as
often as the comparable uncontrolled price method. 1 2
Moreover, allocations of income attributable to intangibles often
cannot rely on similar transactions by unrelated parties."13 The
1968 regulations provided only summary information for treatment
of intangibles.1 4 Thus, a price determination relied strongly on the
circumstances of a transfer of the same or similar intangible prop-
erty by the same transferor to an unrelated transferee. 1 5 When
such comparable transactions were unavailable or inappropriate, the
old regulations did nothing more than suggest twelve factors that
109. See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 14 (noting that because evidence of con-
trolled transactions is often unavailable, many transactions cannot be defined).
110. See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 14 (admitting that complexities of day-to-
day business conditions put many conceptual and practical difficulties in way of application of
comparable uncontrolled price, resale price, or cost plus methods and recognizing that object
of arm's length paradigm is to find price acceptable for each specific case). The OECD's
principal guidelines suggest that "[any method which is used will involve problems ofjudge-
ment and the evaluation of evidence and it has to be recognized that the object of using it is to
produce a figure which is acceptable for practical purposes." Id. The 1968 Treasury regula-
tions do shed a little more light on the subject, stating that in cases defying definition by
comparable uncontrolled price, resale price, or cost plus method, some other "appropriate
method" should be used. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e)(I)(iii) (as amended in 1988).
Although the temporary regulations do provide a catchall provision that determines an ap-
propriate arm's length price by reference to component measures of profitability that are
available from uncontrolled transactions, they do not pretend to provide for every possible
situation. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5T, 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5290-93 (1993) (delineating
comparable profits method); infra notes 198-217, 253-68 and accompanying text (discussing
adoption of comparable profits method). The new regulations therefore permit recourse to
"other methods" under certain circumstances. See Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-3T(e), -
4T(d), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5286-87, 5288-90 (setting conditions for application of fourth method
valuation of tangible and intangible property).
111. White Paper, supra note 59, at 469.
112. See COMPTROLLER GEN., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GGD-81-81, REPORT TO THE
CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS OF THE UNITED STATES: IRS COULD BET-
TER PROTECT U.S. TAX INTERESTS IN DETERMINING THE INCOME OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS 31 (1981) (noting predominant application of fourth method analysis by IRS tax
examiners).
113. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text (discussing round-trip transfers and
difficulty encountered in valuing intangible property).
114. SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1988) (stating generally that intan-
gible property associated with sale may affect price of property).
115. See id. (explaining comparable price method and noting that if similar transactions
cannot be found, standard is amount that would have been paid by unrelated party for same
property under same circumstances).
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could be considered in determining an arm's length price. 116
Although the twelve factors did contemplate a failure to obtain satis-
factory comparable transactions, the regulations were criticized for
providing insufficient guidance for applying them. 117 The IRS
therefore often found it necessary to improvise valuation regimes,
often loosely following valuation methods prescribed for transfers
of tangible property. 118
Despite the lack of specific guidelines, the Tax Court has consist-
ently established several submethods of transfer price allocation
under the fourth method. 19 The most commonly used submethods
are profit split, rate of return, and income to expense ratios. 120 Of
these procedures, the most commonly used is the profit split
method, which simply divides the total profits attributable to the
116. lId § 1.482-2(d)(2)(iii)(a)-(m). These categories were:
(a) The prevailing rates in the same industry or for similar property,
(b) The offers of competing transferors or the bids of competing transferees,
(c) The terms of the transfer, including limitations on the geographic area covered
and the exclusive or nonexclusive character of any rights granted,
(d) The uniqueness of the property and the period for which it is likely to remain
unique,
(e) The degree and duration of protection afforded to the property under the laws
of the relevant countries,
(f) Value of services rendered by the transferor to the transferee in connection with
the transfer ....
(g) Prospective profits to be realized or costs to be saved by the transferee through
its use or subsequent transfer of the property,
(h) The capital investment and starting up expenses required of the transferee ....
(j) The availability of substitutes for the property transferred,
(k) The arm's length rates and prices paid by unrelated parties where the property
is resold or sublicensed to such parties,
(1) The costs incurred by the transferor in developing the property, and
(m) Any other fact or circumstance which unrelated parties would have been likely
to consider in determining the amount of an arm's length consideration for the
property.
Id£
The new regulations provide considerably more sophisticated guidelines for establishing
comparability of transactions for both tangible and intangible property. Under the new rules,
comparability is determined by comparative analysis of functions, risks, contractual terms,
economic conditions, and the property or services involved in the compared transactions.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(c), 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5273-75 (1993); see infra notes 238-46
and accompanying text (examining revised standards of comparability).
117. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 460 (arguing that old regulations provided insuffi-
cient guidance because relative importance of each of twelve factors was unclear).
118. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 463 (discussing international examiners' difficulty
in allocating income attributable to transfers of intangibles). In fact, in approximately 40% of
the cases involving intangibles that were surveyed in preparing the White Paper, international
examiners reported inability to value intangibles under existing regulations and therefore re-
sorted to different valuation methods. White Paper, supra note 59, at 466 n.53.
119. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 469-71 (discussing and analyzing cases in which
Tax Court used differing fourth method approaches).
120. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 469-71 (discussing use of methods in cases involv-
ing sales of tangible property, transfers of intangibles, and provision of services).
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controlled transactions at issue among the related parties. 121 The
validity of a court's final determination therefore rests on the accu-
rate determination of actual profits and the reasonableness of the
factors the court uses to divide profits among related parties. 122
The factors used to obtain this profit split ratio ordinarily include
each party's functions in the overall transaction, the property con-
tributed by each party, and the risks undertaken by each party. 125
Unlike the three formal methods set forth by the regulations,
however, the fourth method permits application of whatever means
of analysis a court deems proper under the circumstances.124 In
spite of the growing reliance on the profit split approach, 125 some
courts apply different methods, such as a rate of return approach or
an analysis of income to expense ratios. 26 In discussing the ap-
proaches available under the fourth method, the IRS has noted that
although rate of return and income to expense ratios may provide a
reasonable basis for determining transfer prices, courts have yet to
develop these methods as a means to fill the analytic holes left by
the § 482 regulations in cases where it is impossible to locate com-
parable uncontrolled transactions. 127 An IRS study performed in
preparation for promulgating regulations under the revised
§ 482128 therefore recommended that the profit split approach or a
newly developed method should make clear the most prominent
gray areas that fourth method analyses address. 129
121. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 469-70 (defining profit split method and acknowl-
edging courts' frequent use of method).
122. White Paper, supra note 59, at 469.
123. White Paper, supra note 59, at 469. For example, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Commissioner, 84
T.C. 996 (1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 856 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1988), involved transfers
of highly valuable manufacturing intangibles, including patents and technical assistance, from
a pharmaceutical company to a manufacturing subsidiary located in Puerto Rico in considera-
tion of a single transfer of the subsidiary's stock. Eli Lilly, 84 T.C. at 1002-27. In allocating
significant profits back to the parent, the Tax Court pointed out, among other things, that a
transfer of the type undertaken by the pharmaceutical company ordinarily would be made in
consideration of a continuing income stream or periodic royalty rather than a single lump
sum. Id. at 1147-53.
124. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3T(e)(1), 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5286 (1993) (permitting
recourse to other valuation methods if standard methods are inadequate).
125. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 469 (observing that profit split is most frequently
used fourth method approach); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6T, 58 Fed. Reg. at 5313-16
(proposing detailed profit split methodology and giving IRS authority to apply profit split
provisions in determining arm's length results).
126. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 470 (discussing judicial application of rate of re-
turn and income to expense ratios in courts that choose not to use profit split). The rate of
return approach compares a company's return on capital to that of other companies to show
comparisons to the industry as a whole. Id. Income to expense ratios compare gross income
to total operating costs. Id.
127. White Paper, supra note 59, at 471.
128. White Paper, supra note 59, at 458.
129. White Paper, supra note 59, at 471. The White Paper noted, however, that the courts
"generally have failed to adopt a consistent and predictable methodology," and recom-
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF TRANSFER PRICING METHODS UNDER THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986
In 1986, Congress recognized problems that the IRS faced in ap-
plying and enforcing the arm's length standard.130 Congress articu-
lated growing perceptions that corporations were avoiding taxes in
spite of the existing transfer pricing rules.13 1 In enacting the Tax
Reform Act of 1986,132 Congress amended the essential articulation
of U.S. transfer pricing policy: Internal Revenue Code § 482.133
Prior to its amendment, § 482 did not address the particularly
troublesome question of intangible property. 3 4 Intangible prop-
erty generally comprises a broad range of items such as patents,
processes, or other proprietary information. 3 5 The dilemma asso-
ciated with placing a dollar value on transfers of intangible property
mirrors the problems implicit in applying the international arm's
length standard. While related parties often trade in goods and
other tangible items of a highly proprietary nature, which therefore
are difficult to price, 136 they may also undertake patent assignments,
licensing agreements, or outright sales of intangibles, the value of
which may be measured only after the transferee has derived income
mended that Treasury promulgate such a methodology. Id.; see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
6T, 58 Fed. Reg. at 5313-16 (proposing formal profit split methodology).
130. See 136 CONG. REC. H928 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1990) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski)
(pointing out that in 1986, foreign-controlled U.S. companies reported "negative tax liability
of over $1 billion while also reporting over $500 billion in gross income").
131. See id. at H929 (statement of Rep. Gephardt) (observing that foreign-controlled cor-
porations reporting taxable income for 1986 paid only $3 billion in federal income tax).
132. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C. (1988)).
133. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1231(e)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2562
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 482 (1988)). According to the Treasury regulations, "the purpose of
Section 482 is to ensure that taxpayers clearly reflect income attributable to controlled trans-
actions, and to prevent the avoidance of taxes with respect to such transactions." Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(a)(1), 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5272 (1993).
134. Compare I.R.C. § 482 (1982) (providing no guidelines specific to treatment of intangi-
ble property transfers) with I.R.C. § 482 (1988) (providing that price paid in transfer of intan-
gible property must be "commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible").
135. See I.R.C. § 936(h)(3)(B) (1988) (defining "intangible property"). Section 936 pro-
vides that "intangible property" includes any:
(i) patent, invention, formula, process, design, pattern, or know-how;
(ii) copyright, literary, musical, or artistic composition;
(iii) trademark, trade name, or brand name;
(iv) franchise, license, or contract;
(v) method, program, system, procedure, campaign, survey, study, forecast, esti-
mate, customer list, or technical data; or
(vi) any similar item, which has substantial value independent of the services of any
individual.
Id.
136. See Williams, supra note 35, at 2 (arguing that untested technology has little value and
emphasizing that valuation is significant problem for all tax authorities).
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from them.13 7
For example, a U.S. corporation may spend a great deal of capital
to develop a new product, realizing in the process a substantial tax
deduction for its research and development costs.' 3 8 If the corpora-
tion then earns significant income by transferring the new technol-
ogy to a foreign subsidiary that manufactures and markets the
product, the problem becomes one of determining how much profit
the transferred property will generate. 3 9 The 1986 amendment to
§ 482 addressed this difficult question by providing that the transfer
price or royalty attributable to the transferred intangible must be
commensurate with the income generated through the intangible
property's use.140
This "commensurate with income" standard or "super royalty" 141
represents a novel approach to transfer pricing. Although many
have criticized the commensurate with income standard for its ap-
parent deviation from the arm's length paradigm, 142 the new stan-
137. See Williams, supra note 35, at 1-2 (arguing that because information flow is not con-
tainable, value of intangible property is also not containable and recognizing that such value
is hard to state until after transfer). The IRS has encountered this problem and has con-
cluded that, at least for certain types of intangibles such as those with high profit potential,
comparable transactions between unrelated parties (the basis for arm's length analysis) "al-
most never exist." White Paper, supra note 59, at 473.
138. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 174(a) (West Supp. 1992) (permitting tax deduction for research
and development expenses that are incurred in connection with trade or business).
139. Cf White Paper, supra note 59, at 463-64 (stating that only estimates can be made
using various pricing methods for transfer of property).
140. I.R.C. § 482 (1988). As amended, § 482 states:
In the case of any two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not
incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secre-
tary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or al-
lowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he [or she]
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order
to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organiza-
tions, trades, or businesses. In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property
(within the meaning of section 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such transfer or license
shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible.
Id. (emphasis added).
141. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 314 (discussing origins of term "super royalty" as pay-
ments "greater than industry averages or other commercial standards"); see also STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., IST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX RE-
FORM AC OF 1986 1015 (Joint Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter GENERAL ExPLANATION] (stat-
ing that Congress meant to eliminate assumptions that industry norms or superficially
appropriate royalties would insulate controlled taxpayers from scrutiny under § 482); Nathan
Boidman, Revenue Canada's Transfer Pricing Circular: Selected Commentary, 36 CAN. TAX J. 405,
417 (1988) (stating that radical "super royalty" rule is intended to close avoidance loopholes).
142. See, e.g., Boidman, supra note 141, at 417 (arguing that commensurate with income
standard diverges from arm's length standard "because it disregards licenses entered into by
a U.S. corporation at arm's length prices"); Emil Sunley et al., United States Section 482 White
Paper, in TRANSFER PRICING FOR INTANGIBLES: A COMMENTARY ON THE WHITE PAPER 3, 4 (Fred
C. de Hosson ed., 1989) (disagreeing with IRS's position that commensurate with income
standard is in accordance with arm's length principles).
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dard addresses the transfer pricing problem more directly than does
the arm's length standard. Whereas the arm's length standard seeks
to correct deviations in income distribution by adjusting prices on
an after-the-fact, case-by-case basis, 143 the commensurate with in-
come standard goes to the root issue of transfer pricing by assessing
the origins of corporate income and attempting to allocate to the
correct party the end results of related-party transfers. 144
The amendment to § 482, however, did more than apply a trans-
fer pricing standard that required consideration for transfers of in-
tangibles to be commensurate with the income attributable to those
intangibles.' 45 The Tax Reform Act's legislative history acknowl-
edged that the then-existing regulations neither prescribed a means
for pricing transfers of intangibles 146 nor provided adequate means
for pricing all transfers of tangible property.' 47 The legislative his-
tory recognized not only that many transactions do not compare ob-
jectively with transactions between unrelated parties, 148 but also
that some transactions between related entities simply cannot com-
pare to transactions between unrelated parties.' 49 The amendment
-143. See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 13 (suggesting that adjustment procedures
require analysis of particular circumstances with direct reference to specific facts of each
transaction); see also GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 141, at 1011 (explaining that regula-
tions look to comparable transaction by same transferor of same or similar property).
144. See GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 141, at 1015-17 (explaining that commensurate
with income standard analyzes origin of corporate income and end results of transfers as
means to avoid complicated task of adjusting prices over time to reflect changes in
profitability).
145. See 57 Fed. Reg. 3571,3572 (1992) (comments to proposed regulations) (noting defi-
ciencies in regulations under § 482 concerning transfers of tangible property and proposing
that closely related transactions be viewed together in determining arm's length).
146. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 42, at 423 (stating that allocation of income to
transferor of intangibles does not assure adequate tax allocation under current regulations).
The Committee on Ways and Means noted:
There is a strong incentive for taxpayers to transfer intangibles to related foreign
corporations or possessions corporations in a low tax jurisdiction, particularly when
the intangible has a high value relative to manufacturing or assembly costs. Such
transfers can result in indefinite tax deferral or effective tax exemption on the earn-
ings, while retaining the value of the earnings in the related group.
Id.
147. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 42, at 423-24 (recognizing general difficulty in
obtaining comparable transactions); see also White Paper, supra note 59, at 464-65 (recom-
mending additional measures to facilitate tangible property valuation in light of shortcomings
of existing valuation methods).
148. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 42, at 423-24 (noting inconsistent results when
valuing so-called "comparables").
149. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 42, at 424 (stating that regulations are not at fault,
but suggesting that they are misdirected and pointing out that related-party dealings are fun-
damentally different from transactions between unrelated parties). Comparison problems
arise because affiliated members of a multinational entity operate as individual economic
units, rather than as competitors. Id. Furthermore, related parties do not face the same risk
in transferring proprietary property to a related party as they would if dealing with an unre-
lated party. Id.
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therefore sought to codify existing fourth method analyses with re-
gard to transfers of tangible as well as intangible property.' 50
A. The Commensurate with Income Standard
Although the single-sentence addition to § 482 did not signifi-
cantly alter Treasury's authority under the section, the amendment's
history does appear to alter Treasury's responsibilities and offer
some significant suggestions as to appropriate regulatory meas-
ures.151 For example, the House Ways and Means Committee rec-
ommended that licensing agreements for intangibles be subject to a
retrospective review for purposes of maintaining arm's length roy-
alty rates. 152 In addition, the conference committee suggested that
the IRS carry out a comprehensive study of transfer pricing rules to
determine whether then-existing regulations could be improved. 153
B. The IRS White Paper and the Basic Arm's Length Return Method
On October 18, 1988, the IRS responded to the conference com-
mittee's charge by issuing a comprehensive study of transfer pric-
ing.1 54 This study, known as the White Paper, was described as a
preliminary "discussion draft," intended to elicit commentary from
interested parties. 155 Although the White Paper originally proposed
a standard comment period, the volume of generally negative com-
150. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-637 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4725 (explaining that "conferees concluded that it would be appropriate
for these principles to apply to transfers between related parties generally if income must
otherwise be taken into account").
151. See id. (suggesting that Treasury use innovations in allocating income attributable to
intangibles to develop new methods for allocating income attributable to tangible property).
The conference committee's suggestion is similar to the congressional suggestion that led to
the 1968 amendments to the transfer pricing regulations. See supra note 64 and accompanying
text (discussing legislative history underlying 1968 amendments to Treasury regulations).
152. H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 42, at 424-25. The committee recognized that when
related companies set royalty rates based on industry norms, the income realized from in-
tangibles may be much higher than the agreed-to royalties reflect. Id. The committee there-
fore recommended a commensurate with income standard, which implicitly permits the IRS to
address the correlation between royalties charged and income earned from previous tax years.
Id This approach has been subjected to harsh criticism. For example, Nathan Boidman ar-
gues that the commensurate with income standard diverges from the arm's length standard
because it disregards licenses entered into by a US corporation at arm's-length
prices. Instead, an appraisal or reassessment of the income must be taken into ac-
count by or imputed to the US transferor of the intangibles annually, and this
amount must be "commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible."
Boidman, supra note 141, at 417.
153. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 150, at 638.
154. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 456-500 (outlining problems and suggesting solu-
tions to transfer pricing problems); see also Kaplan, supra note 4, at 315 (explaining necessity
for White Paper study to solve problems such as double taxation on intangible property
transfers).
155. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 453 (soliciting comments); Kaplan, supra note 4, at
315 (describing Treasury's problem-solving approach in White Paper).
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ments received 156 forced Treasury to extend the comment period
indefinitely and to postpone issuing its proposed and working regu-
lations until 1992 and 1993, respectively.1 57
1. The White Paper's interpretation of the commensurate with income
standard
In discussing the application of the commensurate with income
standard, the authors of the White Paper distinguished between
"normal profit intangibles" and "high profit intangibles."'' 5 8 The
authors reasoned that comparable uncontrolled transactions are
more likely to exist where a transferred intangible is not likely to
produce an unusually high profit. 59 The problem with allocating
royalties after the fact is that such royalties will likely be so high as
to appear to violate the arm's length rule.160 While an apparently
inordinate "super royalty" might cause no problems for the tax au-
thority imposing it, such a policy might concern the country to
which the intangible is transferred,' 6 ' thereby leading to double tax-
ation of the income attributable to that intangible. 62
The authors of the White Paper nonetheless stressed that their
goal was not to create international tax conflicts. 63 Rather, they
made clear their understanding that "for certain classes of in-
156. See, e.g., Dr. Christoph Bellstedt, A German Tax Practitioner's View on the White Paper, in
TRANSFER PRICING FOR INTANGIBLES: A COMMENTARY ON THE WHITE PAPER 66, 66 (Fred C. de
Hosson ed., 1989) (disagreeing with White Paper proposals because IRS's assumptions con-
cerning corporate decisionmaking and "clarity" of § 482 are false); Howard S. Engle, Interna-
tional Developments: Section 482 White Paper-Comments to Treasury, 16J. CORP. TAX'N 386, 386-87
(1990) (summarizing comments that policy suggested by White Paper is overbroad, departs
from international standards, and is impracticable in many situations).
157. See 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5263 (1993) (comments to temporary regulations) (discussing
large number of comments received on White Paper and proposed regulations).
158. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 472-75 (noting differences in applying commensu-
rate with income standards to normal high-profit intangible).
159. White Paper, supra note 59, at 473.
160. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 473 (noting that royalty charged for transfer of
highly valuable intangible to unrelated party may not have similar value as third-party license
for normal intangible).
161. See Friedhelm Jacob, Federal Republic of Germany: Royalties: The New "Super Royalty"
Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code 1986: A German Perspective, 27 EUR. TAX'N 320, 320-22
(1987) (implying that country that tries to apply third-party data in analyzing international
transfers of intangibles as proposed by OECD Model Convention may not reach same income
figure under super royalty standard).
162. See id at 322 (arguing that approach that imputes royalties is likely to cause interna-
tional taxation problems, including double taxation). For example, German authorities have
suggested:
An approach which "forbids," as it were, charging a straightforward sales price and
instead imputes royalty payments (the amount of which is determined using the ben-
efit of hindsight) is likely to cause substantial problems in the international context,
in particular for straight-across transfers between high-tax jurisdictions.
I.
163. White Paper, supra note 59, at 473.
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tangibles (notably high profit potential intangibles for which com-
parables do not exist), the use of inappropriate comparables has
failed to produce results consistent with the arm's length stan-
dard."' 164 Thus, the commensurate with income standard does not
conflict with the international arm's length standard, but merely
represents an arguably better means to determine an arm's length
price. 165
a. Functional analysis of profit components
The existing international commentary on the arm's length stan-
dard embodied in the OECD and U.N. Model Conventions does not
avoid reference to profitability as a possible measure of arm's length
value. 166 The OECD generally sanctions the application of some
type of functional analysis that looks not only to the specific transac-
tion at issue, but also to the whole relationship between transferor
and transferee with regard to the transferred property. 167 The
White Paper, on the other hand, proposed to determine transfer
prices by a series of methods that would parallel those available
under the then-existing regulations.' 68 These methods were the ex-
act and inexact comparable methods, 169 the basic arm's length re-
turn method (BALRM), 170 and BALRM with profit split. 17 1
The methods proposed in the White Paper are based on an inter-
pretation of the commensurate with income standard that antici-
pates analysis of all aspects of the transferor/transferee relationship
164. White Paper, supra note 59, at 473.
165. Cf. White Paper, supra note 59, at 475 (finding overwhelming evidence that arm's
length is international norm and noting that implementation of valuation method that violates
principles of arm's length would invite international disputes over tax jurisdiction).
166. See, e.g., 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 17 (discussing relevance of functional
analysis of profit); see also White Paper, supra note 59, at 476 (noting OECD's support for
deriving arm's length price from functional analysis of related parties' overall operations, in-
cluding profits).
167. See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 17 (explaining that tax authorities should
take broad view of transaction and parties in assessing profit). The 1979 OECD Report states:
Some familiarity with the structure and organisation of the group and some knowl-
edge of which entities undertake the risks and responsibilities for the various activi-
ties are essential for tax authorities to help them in assessing when a profit is likely to
arise and roughly what sort of profit it is likely to be.
Id.
168. See supra notes 76-108 and accompanying text (discussing comparable uncontrolled
transaction, resale price, and cost plus methods).
169. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 485-88 (discussing role of "exact" and "inexact"
comparables).
170. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 488-90 (describing use and application of
BALRM).
171. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 490-91 (describing profit split addition to BALRM
to be used when BALRM alone is unsatisfactory).
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that contribute to profit. 172 These aspects include the actual income
derived from a transferred intangible, a functional analysis of the
related parties' activities in exploiting the intangible, and the alloca-
tion of costs and risks between the related parties.' 73 In addition,
the commensurate with income standard applies to all transfers of
intangible property regardless of the nature of the intangible, the
amount of income derived from the intangible, or the existence of
similar transfers among unrelated entities.174
b. Periodic adjustment of pricing allocations
The most troublesome feature of the White Paper's evaluation of
the commensurate with income standard is its view that allocation of
income attributable to intangibles may be retrospective, 175 involving
review and alteration of royalties that appeared to be arm's length in
previous tax years.' 76 In cases involving long-term licensing agree-
ments, for example, the standard "requires that intangible income
be redetermined and reallocated"' 77 and that the costs and risks in-
volved in the related parties' activities be reassessed periodically.' 78
In the case of a license, periodic adjustments could be required if
there were substantial changes in factors such as the income attribu-
172. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 474 (concluding that functional analysis of all as-
pects of income is required to determine appropriate tax).
173. White Paper, supra note 59, at 474; see Elizabeth King, The Section 482 White Paper and
the Proposed Regulations: A Comparison of Key Provisions, 4 TAx NOTES IN 'L 331, 332 (1992) (ob-
serving that White Paper requires analysis based on actual rather than projected income and
stating that this income should be allocated to real economic contributions by each party).
174. White Paper, supra note 59, at 474. This is not to say, however, that the commensu-
rate with income standard completely eviscerates the comparable uncontrolled transaction
method. In fact, the White Paper points out that if comparables exist, intangible income must
be allocated on that basis. ld; see King, supra note 173, at 332 (asserting that commensurate
with income standard applies to all transfers of intangibles).
175. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 474 (suggesting periodic reevaluation of income
attributable to intangibles to account for substantial changes); see also Watson, supra note 26,
at 78 (discussing periodic reallocation of income under commensurate with income standard).
176. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 474 (concluding that changes in economic costs
and risks may require altering initial royalty allocation); see also Sunley et al., supra note 142, at
4 (arguing that House Ways and Means Report indicates almost no regard for arm's length
standard and that no international authority supports making periodic adjustments as under
super royalty rule). The greatest negative effect of this rule may be that other tax jurisdictions
would not recognize the validity of periodic adjustments, thereby causing instances of double
taxation. See Sunley et al., supra note 142, at 4 (suggesting that proposed methodology is
departure from international norms and would result in double taxation and enormous ad-
ministrative burdens on taxpayers); see also Guenter Schindler & David Henderson, IRS White
Paper Revisits Section 482, in TRANSFER PRICING FOR INTANGIBLES: A COMMENTARY ON THE
WHrIE PAPER 14, 18 (Fred C. de Hosson ed., 1989) (suggesting that White Paper provisions
may shift income to United States, thereby unduly benefiting United States while not signifi-
cantly decreasing foreign taxes paid by company).
177. White Paper, supra note 59, at 474.
178. White Paper, supra note 59, at 474; see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 150, at II-
637-38, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4725 (stating that continuing transfers such as licens-
ing agreements should be subject to review to determine royalty's adequacy).
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table to the intangible, the relative economic activities performed by
the related parties, or the assets employed by the licensee.' 79
On its face, the periodic adjustment provision appears to depart
from the arm's length standard because it permits the calculation of
an appropriate royalty to go forward after information regarding
profits realized on a transfer has become available. 180 Nonetheless,
unrelated parties ordinarily do not enter into licensing agreements,
particularly agreements involving high-profit intangibles, without
including some means of adjusting royalties if actual profitability
were greater or less than expected.18 ' Despite its superficial conflict
with the arm's length standard, periodic review would actually in-
corporate the spirit of the arm's length standard by permitting a tax
authority to set transfer prices by the same means as would unre-
lated parties, who might be inclined to enter into a royalty agree-
ment that permitted periodic rate adjustments. 182
2. The basic arm's length return method
The centerpiece of the White Paper's proposals is the functional
analysis involved in the BALRM. t83 As its name suggests, the
BALRM seeks to determine the return on investment that unrelated
parties might expect if they engaged in the same transaction by at-
tributing income to each related member of a multinational
group. 184 The BALRM identifies the contributions, including "as-
sets and other factors of production," of each member of a group
179. White Paper, supra note 59, at 478; see King, supra note 173, at 332-33 (describing
White Paper's suggestion of periodic adjustment requirement). The White Paper suggested
that guidelines for determining whether to subject a taxpayer to periodic review should
include:
(a) the size and number of markets penetrated; (b) the product's market share; (c) the
product's sales volume; (d) the product's sales revenue; (e) the number of uses for
the technology; () improvements to the technology; (g) marketing expense; (h) pro-
duction costs; (i) the services provided by each party in connection with the use of
the intangible; and (j) the product's profit margin or the process' cost savings.
White Paper, supra note 59, at 478-79. The new regulations permit retrospective analyses
based on unavailability of reliable data for the current tax year, the effect of business cycles on
the taxpayer's industry, and the effects of life cycles on the intangible product that was the
subject of the controlled transaction. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(d)(3)(v)(B), 58 Fed. Reg.
5263, 5278 (1993).
180. See Watson, supra note 26, at 77-78 (noting that mandatory readjustment of royalty
rates may conflict with arm's length standard).
181. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 479, 486-87 (implying that unrelated-party trans-
fers rarely involve high-profit intangibles that would require periodic review).
182. Cf White Paper, supra note 59, at 478-79 (discussing IRS's reasoning and authority
for periodic review).
183. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 488-91 (describing basic arm's length method, or
BALRM, and its applicability to exact and inexact comparables).
184. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 488-89 (providing goal of BALRM and explaining
its applicability); see also King, supra note 173, at 335-36 (summarizing income attribution
function of BALRM).
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and allocates each party's income by comparing those contributions
to the income earned by the enterprise as a whole.' 8 5
The transfer scheme to which the BALRM applies corresponds
closely to the third hypothetical discussed previously. 8 6 In a situa-
tion where a related foreign licensee takes only the intangible prop-
erty but contributes all raw materials, labor, and technical know-how
to manufacture a finished product, the value of the transferred in-
tangible property is not reflected directly by the sale price of the
185. White Paper, supra note 59, at 488-89. See generally Kaplan, supra note 4, at 316-17
(illustrating application of BALRM to hypothetical transfer between U.S. parent and market-
ing subsidiary located in tax haven jurisdiction). As this description suggests, the BALRM is
an "input-based" methodology. See King, supra note 173, at 335 (contrasting BALRM, which
analyzes component parts contributing to realized profit, with traditional "output" methodol-
ogies, which compare taxpayer's stated income with income imputed from similar transactions
by unrelated parties). Although the arm's length standard generally invites analysis based on
output, both the BALRM and traditional methodologies rely on comparables and reach the
same result. See id. at 335 (stating that input-based and output-based methodologies should
yield similar results). The BALRM therefore does not differ substantially from the traditional
arm's length methodology. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 475-77 (reasoning that tradi-
tional arm's length analysis and BALRM both anticipate individual calculation of earnings by
each related group member); George N. Carlson et al., The Section 482 White Paper: Highlights
and Implications, or How Economists Stopped Feeling Inferior to Tax Lawyers and Learned To Love Tax
Reform, 41 TAX NoTEs 547, 548 (1988) (observing similarity between BALRM and arm's
length standard and stating that by using BALRM, "White Paper reaffirms the arm's length
principle as the cornerstone of U.S. intercompany pricing rules"). But see Engle, supra note
156, at 390-91 (characterizing BALRM as unworkable under certain conditions such as when
intangibles are used to produce more than one product); Sunley et al., supra note 142, at 4
(stating that BALRM diverges from international standard, particularly in application of peri-
odic adjustments); see also Boidman, supra note 141, at 417 (criticizing commensurate with
income basis for disregarding licenses entered into at arm's length prices in favor of compre-
hensive analysis).
One criticism of the BALRM is that its use rules out, in all situations in which specific corn-
parables are lacking, the use of equally effective methods such as profit split. See Kaplan, supra
note 4, at 318 (criticizing reliance on BALRM as principal, rather than default method).
Other criticisms provide that the BALRM generally ignores the crucial element of risk as-
sumption, see Jon E. Bischel, White Paper Analysis: Ballroom Dancing with an Intangible, 41 TAX
NoTEs 1097, 1098 (1988) (noting that Treasury did not address risk assumption in White
Paper), and that BALRM's record-keeping requirements would impose an administrative
nightmare on taxpayers, even where necessary information was available. See 57 Fed. Reg.
3571, 3572 (1992) (comments to proposed regulations) (citing comments asserting that infor-
mation required by BALRM might not always be available); Sunley et al., supra note 142, at 4
(noting that taxpayers' failure to keep adequate documentation presents administrative prob-
lem). A final criticism is that the BALRM misses the essential purpose of transfer pricing,
which is to allocate income among geographic tax jurisdictions rather than among related
entities. See Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 342-43 (making clear that no requirement
exists that reallocation powers be consistent with international division of taxes). The
BALRM, Wickham and Kerester contend, merely carries on the problems implicit in the old
regulations. Id. at 342-43. They further state:
The end result is a system strong in preserving and encouraging the power of the
country to reallocate tax attributes in ways that will protect and increase its revenues
but very weak and lacking in mandates to consider revenue interests and tax claims
of other countries based on the source of the income.
Id. at 343; see also 57 Fed. Reg. at 3572 (admitting that BALRM would most likely allocate
income disproportionately to U.S. entities).
186. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text (summarizing typical "round-trip"
transfer of intangible property).
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finished product.' 87 Furthermore, comparable uncontrolled trans-
actions may not be adequate to value the intangible in this type of
situation. 188
Thus, the BALRM first applies a functional analysis that separates
into their component functions all aspects of the related businesses
that the intangible transfer affects.' 8 9 Next, the method assigns a
value to each function performed by the affiliate to which the intan-
gible was transferred.' 90 After the returns attributable to each of
the affiliate's functions have been calculated, the residual income, or
income attributable solely to the intangible property, is allocated to
the parent.' 9 '
Despite the BALRM's apparent departure from a standard search
for comparable uncontrolled transfers, the departure is largely su-
perficial.192 Whereas traditional arm's length analysis seeks uncon-
trolled dealings involving transactions similar to the transfer at
issue, the BALRM's "breakdown" methodology continues to use
comparable transaction information to determine the relative effect
of each part of a transaction on the profitability of the transaction as
a whole. 193 Because any methodology employed under the BALRM
must rely implicitly on arm's length information, the BALRM can-
187. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 488 (discussing difficulties inherent in pricing
transactions where intangible property is mere component of finished product).
188. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 488-89 (highlighting limitations of traditional anal-
ysis and explaining how process of comparing similar transactions can be inadequate basis on
which to price intangibles).
189. White Paper, supra note 59, at 488.
190. White Paper, supra note 59, at 489. The rationale underlying this process is that each
discrete function carried on by an affiliate in employing the intangible may be measured and
valued using standard factors. Id
191. White Paper, supra note 59, at 489.
192. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 476 (asserting that arm's length standard implies
BALRM or similar functional analysis and fits in with periodic adjustments); Watson, supra
note 26, at 78 (arguing that limited periodic reviews under BALRM methodology would still
conform to arm's length).
193. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 476 (arguing that traditional arm':; length analysis
as espoused by OECD is not inconsistent with functional analysis because both analyses ulti-
mately utilize similar means to determine likely profits). The White Paper suggests two meth-
ods for incorporating comparable arm's length data into the BALRM equation. The first
method examines unrelated parties' assets and contributions to ultimate income, calculates
appropriate rates of return for each function based on similar functions carried on by unre-
lated parties, and applies the expected rate of return to each party's assets. Id. at 489. The
second method, which is useful when "assets are difficult to measure consistently, or ...
where there is reason to believe that the relationship between income and costs is more stable
or easier to measure than the relationship between income and assets," computes the ratio of
gross income to operating costs for the foreign affiliate and compares the ratio to correspond-
ing ratios of unrelated parties engaged in similar operations. Id. This second method, com-
monly referred to as a "Berry ratio," see id. (discussing method's use by Dr. Charles Berry to
calculate returns on service activities, among other things), provided the basis for the rate of
return determination in E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 608 F.2d 445, 449-
56 (Ct. Cl. 1979), where the court used Berry's computed ratio to determine gross income
before reducing operating and interest costs.
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not help but satisfy the spirit of the arm's length standard.1 94
The BALRM indicates, however, that traditional application of
the arm's length standard has limits, especially where certain trans-
actions are so unique to the parties involved that they would not
occur between unrelated parties. 195 The type of functional analysis
proposed by the BALRM appears to be within the OECD's pro-
posed methods for determining an arm's length price. 196 Indeed, a
functional analysis is practically mandatory to attribute proper roy-
alties to transfers of particularly valuable intangibles when even
prices charged between unrelated parties may not adequately reflect
all arm's length considerations. 197
C. The Emerging Regulatory Framework
1. The proposed regulations
Early commentary on the White Paper was generally critical of the
IRS proposals, particularly the perceived overreliance on the
BALRM. 198 In January 1992,199 the U.S. Treasury responded by
proposing regulations that would replace the BALRM with a compa-
rable profit valuation method. 200 This new method coordinated its
functional analysis by means of a "comparable profit interval"
(CPI), or index of acceptable profit ranges derived from functionally
comparable profit indicators observable in uncontrolled
transactions.20'
194. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 488 (arguing that because BALRM determines final
arm's length price attributable to given transaction by analyzing each part of operation in-
volved with intangible, BALRM employs comparable information available from dealings
among unrelated parties). The primary difference between the BALRM and traditional meth-
ods, therefore, is the scope of the requisite inquiry.
195. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 473 (observing that unrelated parties rarely trans-
act in highly valuable intangible property).
196. See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 17 (suggesting that tax authorities apply
functional analysis to determine arm's length prices). But see Sunley et al., supra note 142, at 6
(asserting that no international authority, including OECD, supports periodic adjustments).
197. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 473 (describing need for independent analysis of
high-profit intangibles because high royalty rates are rarely arm's length). Unrelated parties
involved in a transfer or license of intellectual property may themselves be hard pressed to set
a royalty rate that they find appropriate. Just what constitutes a royalty that will provide a fair
rate of return for intellectual property is the subject of some debate. See generally Russell L.
Parr, Insights into Royalty Rate Economics, 15 LEs NOUVELLES 95, 96-97 (1990) (asserting that
methods commonly used to establish royalty rates fail to account adequately for rates of re-
turn on investment).
198. See 57 Fed. Reg. 3571, 3572 (1992) (comments to proposed regulations) (noting ad-
verse commentary to White Paper and admitting burdensome effect of undue reliance on
BALRM).
199. See id. at 3571-3601 (publishing and explaining proposed regulations).
200. See id. at 3574 (describing comparable profit interval method and explaining steps
and reasons for proposed changes).
201. See id. (relating mathematical comparable profit interval to uncontrolled party
analysis).
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Although the proposed regulations offered a reliable method for
constructing transfer prices, they did so only with great complex-
ity. 20 2 Despite the presence of fairly orthodox methods based on
comparable transactions, 20 3 the proposals also prescribed a strict
priority of application,204 which itself drew negative criticism.20 5
Moreover, the proposals' functional analysis centerpiece, CPI, was
intended not only to determine appropriate prices under the com-
parable profit method,20 6 but also to provide a check on the ade-
quacy of adjustments made under the comparable adjustable
transaction method. 20 7
In fact, merely assembling a CPI is a complex operation requiring
careful planning and accounting by a taxpayer who uses the method.
Construction of the CPI for any given transaction requires six steps:
(1) selecting the controlled entity to be tested (usually the trans-
feree);208 (2) determining appropriate business classifications asso-
ciated with the transferred intangible and developing a sample of
unrelated entities that engage in similar operations;209 (3) comput-
ing "constructive operating incomes" derived from an application
of profit indicators, such as return ratios or profit splits, to the
tested party's attributes such as assets and costs; 210 (4) computing
an appropriate CPI by isolating the most uniform unrelated-party
202. See Steven P. Hannes, An Examination of the New U.S. Transfer Pricing Proposals, 3 TAX
NoTEs INT'L 281, 291 (1992) (projecting that proposed measures would impose great burdens
of tax planning and information gathering on taxpayers).
203. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(3), 57 Fed. Reg. 3571, 3580-81 (1992) (describing
matching transaction method); id. § 1.482-2(d)(4), 57 Fed. Reg. at 3581-83 (describing com-
parable adjustable transaction method); id. § 1.482-2(d)(5), 57 Fed. Reg. at 3583-84 (describ-
ing comparable profit method). The matching transaction and comparable adjustable
transaction methods generally correspond to the comparable uncontrolled transaction
method, the resale price method, and the cost plus method available under the old regula-
tions. See 57 Fed. Reg. 3571, 3573 (1992) (comments to proposed regulations) (discussing
matching transaction and comparable adjustable transaction methods in term!; similar to then-
existing methods).
204. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(2)(iii), 57 Fed. Reg. at 3580 (prescribing specific
priority of application of different methods for determining arm's length considerations).
205. See Helmut Becker, The Citizen and the Role of Taxation, 1992 INTERTAX 210, 210 (con-
tending that priority system established by tax authority unduly shifts burden from tax exam-
iner to taxpayer at expense of practical efficiency).
206. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(5)(i), 57 Fed. Reg. at 3583 (explaining that CPI
would be used if no uncontrolled transfers meet matching or comparable adjustable
standards).
207. See id. § 1.482-2(d)(4)(i), 57 Fed. Reg. at 3581-82 (explaining that potential compara-
ble adjustable transaction would not satisfy requirements of method if result were not within
CPI).
208. Id. § 1.482-2(0(3)(i), 57 Fed. Reg. at 3587; see King, supra note 173, at 336 (describ-
ing process for designating test party).
209. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(0(3)(ii), 57 Fed. Reg. at 3587; see King, supra note 173, at
1 336-37 (detailing two-part test for determining appropriate business classification).
210. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(O(3)(iii), 57 Fed. Reg. at 3587; see King, supra note 173,
at 337 (suggesting procedure for determining constructive operating incomes).
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data;2 1 1 (5) determining "the most appropriate point" in the CP, if
necessary;21 2 and (6) determining an appropriate transfer price
based on the CPI.213 Nonetheless, to the extent that the CPI incor-
porates valuation methods that are already in informal use, such as
profit split or rate of return analyses,21 4 and to the extent that it
offers a reasonably objective means by which to price particularly
difficult transactions,2 1 5 the CPI would appear to offer a measure of
objective certainty unavailable under the old regulations. The CPI's
reliance on data derived from unrelated-party dealings, while argua-
bly minute in detail, is firmly grounded in the international standard
of arm's length.2 16 As such, commentary on the proposed regula-
tions criticized not so much the CPI as its predominance over more
traditional methodologies.2 1 7
2. The new regulations
Temporary regulations that became effective on April 21,
1993,218 respond to adverse criticism of the 1992 proposals by in-
creasing the pricing rules' flexibility while simultaneously attempt-
ing to limit ambiguities that might have surfaced under the
proposed regulations.2 1 9 The temporary regulations retain a vari-
211. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(0(3)(iv), 57 Fed. Reg. at 3587; see King, supra note 173,
at 337 (illustrating computation of appropriate CPI).
212. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(f)(3)(v), 57 Fed. Reg. at 3587; see King, supra note 173, at
337 (suggesting that taxpayer's relative parity with unrelated entities from which CPI is de-
rived provides basis for placement on interval). Application of this step ordinarily is not re-
quired unless the consideration paid was manifestly disproportionate to the income realized.
King, supra note 173, at 336.
213. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(f)(3)(vi), 57 Fed. Reg. at 3587; see King, supra note 173,
at 337 (suggesting that any point within interval would be proper transfer price unless circum-
stances require otherwise).
214. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (explaining proposed regulations' utiliza-
tion of orthodox valuation methods).
215. See 57 Fed. Reg. 3571, 3574 (1992) (comments to proposed regulations) (asserting
that CPI would permit taxpayers "to apply objective measures of profitability.., to their own
financial data" and thereby confirm or correct reported transfer prices).
216. See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 17 (recommending functional analysis of
unrelated parties in determining arm's length price). By reducing noncomparable transac-
tions to their component parts, a tax examiner may apply more traditional analyses to ascer-
tain values for each segment of the related-party transfer. See id. (stating importance of
breaking down entities into functional segments in order to assess likely profits from transac-
tion). Because the parts that compose the CPI are derived by standard arm's length methods,
the method as a whole utilizes basic arm's length principles. See 57 Fed. Reg. at 3574 (issuing
priority to methods that most accurately produce arm's length price).
217. See 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5265 (1993) (comments to temporary regulations) (noting
that commenters disagreed with proposed use of CPI as both valuation method and check on
other methods, but praised flexibility offered under CPI).
218. lId at 5263.
219. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-IT(a)(1), 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5272 (1993) (explaining
that new rules are intended to reflect income more clearly than old regulations); id. § 1.482-
1T(b) (2) (iii) (A), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5273 (increasing flexibility of rules by implementing choice of
method provision); see also New Transfer Pricing Rules Seen Offering Flexibility, Requiring Added Dou-
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ant of the comparable profits method that the proposed regulations
advocated, however, 220 and the apparent perceived congressional
mandate for greater accuracy in determining transfer prices
promises to manifest itself in heavier reporting burdens for taxpay-
ers.221 Furthermore, preliminary international response has been
tentative, with feedback ranging from praise for the new regula-
tions' return to a standard more in line with international norms, 222
to fears that the regulations will impose rigid pricing margins that
will discriminate among firms operating under different economic
conditions.223 Some responses also reflect mistrust of the Clinton
administration, which is perceived as being too zealous in its efforts
to fulfill campaign promises for more aggressive enforcement of
transfer pricing rules.2 24 Regardless of any adverse reaction, the
temporary regulations will provide a clinical setting within which the
§ 482 amendment may be assessed.2 25
The new regulations provide a total of eight valuation methods:
five apply to transfers of tangible property226 and three apply to
mentation, Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA) at I (Jan. 19, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Omni File [hereinafter New Transfer Pricing Rules] (summarizing practitioners' comments ac-
knowledging increased flexibility and certainty of results under new rules).
220. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5T, 58 Fed. Reg. at 5290-93 (setting forth applicabil-
ity of comparable profits method under new regulations as means to determine arm's length
result); see also supra notes 200-15 and accompanying text (discussing comparable profit valua-
tion method under proposed regulations).
221. See New Transfer Pricing Rules, supra note 219, at I (noting concern that compliance
with new regulations will require increased documentation).
222. See, e.g., Larry Black, U.S. Loosens Its Rules on Taxesfor Multinationals, INDEPENDENT, Jan.
15, 1993, at 22 (praising new rules as similar to rules applied in United Kingdom by U.K. tax
authority Inland Revenue).
223. See, e.g., Samuel Slutsky, U.S. Moves on Transfer Pricing, FIN. PosT, Jan. 20, 1993, at 12
(commenting on inflexibility of new regulations and their resulting effect). Such fears seem
unfounded, however, because the regulations provide for adjustments on the basis of special
circumstances such as short-term market penetration strategies and differences between geo-
graphic markets. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(c)(4), 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5275-76 (1993)
(recognizing market share strategy and different geographic markets as two circumstances in
which parties may adjust transfer price as determined by comparable uncontrolled
transaction).
224. See, e.g., George Graham, Fresh Tax Rules for Foreign Companies Win Wary Backing, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 1993, at 4 (opining that issuance of regulations by exiting administration
leaves open possibility for meddling by Clinton administration, especially in light of President
Clinton's pledge to levy higher taxes on foreign corporations). However aggressive the new
administration may be in its enforcement of the transfer pricing rules, it is unlikely that the
IRS would risk political disaster by summarily abandoning its four-year development of the
new rules and turning its back on the immense body of commentary that has accumulated
since passage of the Tax Reform Act.
225. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text (discussing congressional charge to
IRS to conduct study on improving regulations under amended § 482 and reporting public
response to study).
226. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3T(a), 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5282 (1993) (prescribing
application of comparable uncontrolled price, resale price, cost plus, comparable profits, and
other methods for transfers of tangible property). In addition, a new proposed regulation
would permit application of profit splits as a sixth method. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6T,
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transfers of intangible property. 227 Apart from the addition of the
comparable profit method, 228 the new regulations' valuation mecha-
nisms do not differ radically from those of the old regulations. 229
The essential differences between the old and new regulations are
rooted in the procedural measures provided under temporary
Treasury regulation § 1.482-1T. 230 Specifically, the most significant
changes lie in the adoption of a choice of method rule,231 detailed
and flexible standards of comparability, 23 2 and a "safe harbor" for
small taxpayers. 233 Although the reporting burdens necessary to
prove comparability between given transactions may increase under
the new regulations, the general effect of the regulations should
benefit taxpayers by providing them with flexible means ofjustifying
their reported income allocations while improving upon the accu-
racy and reliability of more traditional methods.
a. Choice of method
In response to comments on the proposed regulations, the IRS
acknowledged that problems exist with imposing a rigid hierarchy
for applying valuation methods and therefore promulgated the
58 Fed. Reg. 5310, 5313-16 (1993) (proposing temporary profit split methodology as means
to calculate arm's length return in transactions involving tangible or intangible property). In
addition, although the new rules adhere to generally accepted methods, they provide detailed
guidance for applying those rules. See, e.g., Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3T(b)(2)(ii), 58 Fed.
Reg. at 5283 (indicating that relevant factors in applying comparable uncontrolled price
method include examination of product quality, sales volume, market level, geographic mar-
ket in which transaction takes place, date of transaction, available alternatives, and intangible
property associated with sale); id. § 1.482-3T(c)(3)(ii), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5284 (noting that in-
ventory levels and turnover rates, scope and terms of warranties, marketing or advertising
programs in effect, sales volumes, level of market, foreign currency risks, and extensions of
credit and payment terms are particularly relevant in applying resale price method); id.
§ 1.482-3T(d)(3)(ii), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5286 (calling for application of cost plus method with
reference to complexity of manufacturing or assembly, engineering involved, purchasing and
inventory control procedures, expenses, foreign currency risks, and credit and payment
terms).
227. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4T(a), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5287 (prescribing application
of comparable uncontrolled transactions, comparable profits, and other methods for transfers
of intangibles). The proposed profit split methodology would also apply to valuation of in-
tangibles. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6T, 58 Fed. Reg. 5310, 5313-16 (1993) (setting forth
proposed profit split method as additional valuation method for transfers of intangibles).
228. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5T, 58 Fed. Reg. at 5290-93.
229. Compare Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3T(a), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5282 (presenting compa-
rable uncontrolled price, resale price, cost plus, comparable profits, and other valuation
methods) with Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e) (as amended in 1988) (implementing only comparable
uncontrolled price, resale price, and cost plus methods).
230. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-IT, 58 Fed. Reg. at 5272-82 (providing for choice of
method, standards of comparability, scope of review, and special rules).
231. Id § 1.482-1T(b)(2)(iii), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5273.
232. Id. § IA82-IT(c), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5273-79.
233. Id § 1.482-IT()(1), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5281.
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"best method rule." 23 4 The best method rule provides guidelines
by which taxpayers may decide which valuation method will best
meet the circumstances of the transaction under review.235 Rather
than force a particular method into use in a given situation, the best
method rule permits taxpayers to apply any available method that
will allow them to obtain an accurate result.23 6 In general, however,
the rule requires application of the method that will bring about the
most accurate result under the circumstances. 23 7
b. Standards of comparability
The regulations that provide for determining relative comparabil-
ity of controlled and uncontrolled transactions adhere to the princi-
ples of the arm's length standard. 23 8 Because of the lack of
comparable uncontrolled transactions in many circumstances, how-
ever, the new regulations permit the use of a comparable transac-
tion that incorporates factors present in uncontrolled transactions if
the comparable transaction corresponds to factors present in the
transaction under review.239 Comparability is thus reviewed on the
basis of functions, risks, contractual terms, economic conditions,
and property or services involved in the controlled and uncon-
trolled transactions under comparison. 240 By thus compiling a hy-
pothetical comparable transaction from comparable components of
uncontrolled transactions, the new standards of comparability avoid
the problems inherent in comparing whole transactions. Where cer-
tain elements of controlled and uncontrolled transfers differ in
some material respect, they may be adjusted in order to obtain a
functional comparable transaction. 241
In addition, the comparability standards permit adjustment under
special circumstances that would otherwise skew a taxpayer's actual
234. See 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5265 (1993) (comments to temporary regulations) (recogniz-
ing problems inherent in strict priority of methods and announcing best method rule).
235. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-IT(b)(iii)(A), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5273 (providing that in
making valuation method selection, taxpayer should consider factors that include complete-
ness and accuracy of information necessary for applying each method, degree of comparabil-
ity, and number, magnitude, and accuracy of adjustments required under each method).
236. See id. (permitting taxpayers to determine arm's length price using any method avail-
able without first demonstrating inapplicability of other methods).
237. I&
238. See id. § 1.482-IT(c)(1)(i), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5273 ("The arm's length character of a
controlled transaction is tested by comparing the results of uncontrolled taxpayers engaged in
comparable transactions under comparable circumstances.").
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See id. § 1.482-IT(c)(2), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5274 (permitting reasonable adjustments to
account for differences in relevant factors where such differences have clear and reasonably
discernable effect on prices or profits).
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income. For example, the regulation permits adjustments to com-
pensate for a pricing strategy reasonably intended to enhance the
taxpayer's market share,242 thus granting leeway for competitive
strategies and market penetration efforts that might otherwise be
penalized. Furthermore, despite some assertions to the contrary,243
the new regulations provide that comparable transactions should be
obtained from the same geographic market in which the controlled
transaction takes place, 244 so as to permit adjustment for geographic
variables such as costs and resale prices245 and to account for loca-
tion savings.2 46
c. Safe harbors
In response to comments advocating adoption of a "safe harbor,"
or rule permitting before-the-fact election of a strict formulaic
means for determining taxable income,247 the new regulations per-
mit certain taxpayers to elect a safe harbor in lieu of applying other
valuation methods.2 48 To be eligible for the safe harbor, a taxpayer
must be a U.S. entity earning less than $10 million in aggregate an-
nual sales revenue or a U.S. entity that engages in controlled trans-
actions with a foreign entity that earns less than $10 million in
aggregate annual revenue. 249 Eligible taxpayers that elect the safe
harbor are insulated against potential income allocations by apply-
ing an "appropriate profit level indicator" to be provided in forth-
coming revenue procedures.2 50
Although the safe harbor provides a measure of certainty for
smaller firms engaged in controlled transactions, 251 the IRS was
quick to note that the rigidity of the rules applied to determine in-
come under the safe harbor may produce results less favorable than
242. IL § 1.482-1T(c)(4)(i), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5275-76.
243. See, e.g., Slutsky, supra note 223, at 12 (suggesting that new regulations will penalize
firms realizing location savings because of geographic differences in markets).
244. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(c)(4)(ii)(A), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5276.
245. Id.
246. Id. § 1.482-IT(c)(4)(ii)(C), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5276.
247. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 481 (defining "safe harbors" as "mechanical,
bright-line tests that may be used in lieu of the fact-specific arm's length inquiry under section
482"); see also 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5268 (1993) (comments to temporary regulations) (observ-
ing numerous requests for implementation of safe harbor provisions).
248. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1A82-1T(f)(1), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5281 (providing for "small
taxpayer safe harbor").
249. Id. §§ 1A82-1T(f(1)(ii)-(iii), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5281.
250. Id. § 1.482-IT(f)(1)(i), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5281.
251. See 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5268 (1993) (comments to temporary regulations) (asserting
that safe harbor provides more definite rule and reduces reporting and record-keeping
burdens).
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what might be available under the general rules.252 Nevertheless,
the safe harbor provides a positive means for determining appropri-
ate transfer prices. Taxpayers electing the safe harbor will be able
to predict precisely the documentation necessary for reporting in-
come attributable to controlled transactions and may benefit from
the highly simplified requirements for tax planning and accounting.
d. The comparable profits method
Despite criticism of the proposed regulations' heavy reliance on
the CPI,253 the new regulations have carried a "comparable profits
method" (CPM) into application as an alternative method for valu-
ing controlled transfers of tangible and intangible property.254 In
general, the comparable profits method operates on the principle
that "similarly situated taxpayers will tend to earn similar returns
over a reasonable period of time."'255 Like the comparable profits
method provided by the proposed regulations, the new regulation
offers an index, or range of results, that will be deemed
appropriate. 25 6
In general, the CPM compares a taxpayer's profits with a range of
constructive operating profits derived from profit level indicators
available from uncontrolled taxpayers. 257 The method operates by
first selecting a party to be tested, which ordinarily is the party to
the controlled transaction that performs the simplest operations and
which need not be the taxpayer under examination.2583 The CPM
then requires selection of comparable parties that bear profit level
indicators similar to those of the tested party. 259 The term "profit
level indicators" generally means financial ratios that measure the
relationships among profits, costs, and resources involved in the
transactions in question. 26 0 Appropriate profit level indicators in-
252. See id (observing that certain taxpayers may achieve less favorable results under safe
harbor, while others may benefit).
253. See id. at 5265 (discussing commenters' criticism of proposed regulations' overre-
liance on CPI as check on results obtained under other methods).
254. See Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-3T(a)(4), -4T(a)(2), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5282, 5287 (per-
mitting application of comparable profits method to transfers of tangibles and intangibles).
255. 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5270 (1993) (comments to temporary regulations).
256. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5T(d), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5290 (defining arm's length
range as "range of constructive operating profits derived from comparable parties").
257. See 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5270 (1993) (comments to temporary regulations) (discussing
general procedure involved in applying CPM).
258. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5T(b), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5290.
259. Id § 1.482-5T(c), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5290. Because the method seeks to establish a
range of acceptable results, the parties selected need not be strictly comparable, id., and ad-
justments to account for material differences between the profit level indicators of the tested
and comparable parties may be relatively permissive. Id.
260. It § 1.482-5T(e), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5291.
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dude rates of return on capital26 1 and financial ratios such as oper-
ating profit to sales or gross profits to operating expenses. 262
Once a taxpayer determines appropriate comparable profit level
indicators, the final step is to determine the arm's length range.263
Ordinarily, the range includes all of the constructive operating prof-
its derived from the comparable parties.264 When a taxpayer refer-
ences appropriate comparable transactions but does not adjust the
transactions to account for material differences in profit level indica-
tors, the arm's length range generally will fall between the twenty-
fifth and seventy-fifth percentiles of the constructive operating prof-
its derived from the unadjusted profit level indicators. 265
It is important to note that the comparable profits method is of-
fered only as an alternative; the method may not satisfy the require-
ments of all possible transactions. 266 The new regulations maintain
the taxpayer's recourse to fourth method analysis, provided that ad-
equate documentation exists and that the taxpayer makes appropri-
ate disclosure to the IRS. 267 Preserving the "other methods"
analysis perhaps reflects some humility on the part of the IRS, which
seems to acknowledge that the methods set forth in the proposed
regulations will not satisfy the necessities of every circumstance. 268
3. A look forward
A hard look at the new regulations and the generally favorable
response to them by tax practitioners 269 suggests that the IRS has
succeeded in its quest to establish a more accurate and reliable
transfer pricing regime. After years of harsh commentary, 270 the
261. Id § 1.482-5T(e)(1), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5291.
262. Ia § 1.482-5T(e)(2), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5291.
263. See id § 1.482-5T(d)(1), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5290 (setting forth provisions governing
arm's length range determination).
264. See id § 1A82-5T(d)(2)(i), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5290 (providing that constructive operat-
ing profits will provide appropriate arm's length range when appropriate comparability stan-
dards are met).
265. Ia § I.482-5T(d)(2)(ii), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5290-91. This alternative range may be used
only if four or more comparable parties contribute to the constructive operating profits. Id.
266. See id. § 1A82-5T(a), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5290 (describing circumstances under which
CPM may be applied and noting that for purposes of best method rule, CPM may not yield
accurate results in certain transactions involving valuable, nonroutine intangibles).
267. See id. §§ 1.482-3T(e)(2), -4T(d)(2), 58 Fed. Reg. at 5286-87, 5288 (providing condi-
tions for use of other methods for transactions involving tangible and intangible property).
268. See 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5265, 5269 (1993) (comments to temporary regulations) (dis-
cussing criticism of valuation method's rigidity and describing provision that permits use of
other reasonable method where such method is more accurate).
269. See generally New Transfer Pricing Rules, supra note 219, at 1 (reporting general satisfac-
tion with new regulations among tax practitioners).
270. See, e.g., Bellstedt, supra note 156, at 72 (positing that complexity of White Paper with
regard to pricing intangibles raises question of whether IRS intends to discourage U.S. busi-
nesses from making foreign investments); Go Kawada, Comments on Section 482 White Paper, in
1195
1196 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1155
process that began with the issuance of the White Paper appears to
be close to conclusion, and it seems to have addressed the bulk of
prevailing concerns.2 71 Yet to be determined, however, is the extent
to which the IRS has succeeded in carrying out the congressional
mandate of the commensurate with income standard.2 72 To be sure,
the CPM provides significantly more guidance than was available
under the standard methodologies of comparable uncontrolled
price, resale price, and cost plus; nevertheless, the regulations admit
their own limits.2 73 At a minimum, however, the new rules repre-
sent a significant step forward. They offer a great deal of flexibility
of application, and at the same time establish a fairly strict policy for
applying individual valuation methods that promises a measure of
reliability previously unavailable.
Regardless of the revolutionary measures invoked by the new reg-
ulations and regardless of their effectiveness in ascertaining arm's
length prices, however, the proposals represent a unilateral state-
ment of policy.2 74 To the extent that transfer pricing analysis under
the new regulations may vastly clarify and help to control what con-
tinues to be perceived as a substantial revenue loss for the United
States, 275 the regulations will certainly aid in protecting the U.S. fisc.
At the same time, however, the new measures may also cause more
instances of double taxation, thereby burdening taxpayers and tax
authorities in the United States and abroad. 276 Without bilateral co-
TRANSFER PRICING FOR INTANGIBLES: A COMMENTARY ON THE WHITE PAPER 62, 62-64 (Fred C.
de Hosson ed., 1989) (criticizing number of provisions in White Paper, including those relat-
ing to functional analysis, valuation of intangibles, penalties, cost sharing, and enforcement).
271. See New Transfer Pricing Rules, supra note 219, at 1 (observing that new rules address
most-criticized provisions of proposed regulations); Black, supra note 222, at 22 (reporting
praise for new regulations issued by Organization for International Investment in view of fact
that rules have responded to its objections to old tax calculation methods used by multina-
tional corporations).
272. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text (discussing congressional charge to
IRS to study and develop regulations under amended § 482).
273. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-ST(a), 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5290 (1993) (suggesting
that CPM may not provide accurate results when the transaction under review involves "valu-
able, non-routine intangibles" that tested party either obtained from uncontrolled taxpayers,
bearing significant risk and enjoying right to significant economic benefit, or developed itself).
274. See Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 356-57 (asserting that unilateral measures
provide only partial solutions to bilateral tax problems).
275. See John Turro, Treasury Blasted over Alleged Transfer Pricing Shenanigans, 55 TAx NOTES
150, 150 (1992) (discussing findings by House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee that
foreign distributorships had paid U.S. income taxes equaling only 0.4% of U.S. income and
criticizing Government for forgoing foreign revenue).
276. See Japan Foreign Trade Council Worries That Transfer Pricing Regs Will Cause Double Taxa-
tion, 4 TAX NOTES INT'L 1306, 1306 (1992) [hereinafter Japan Foreign Trade Council] (quoting
Yohei Mimura ofJapan Foreign Trade Council, who argued that new transfer pricing regula-
tions would result in double taxation, thereby " 'interfer[ing] with free market price competi-
tion' and 'smooth economic exchange' "); cf. Lee Sheppard, Canadian and German Perspectives
Offered on White Paper, 44 TAx NOTES 488, 488-89 (1989) (citing Canadian concerns that peri-
odic adjustment is biased to favor U.S. fisc and predicting more instances of double taxation).
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operation, or at least acknowledgment of the validity of the new val-
uation regime, the United States and its trading partners will likely
disagree over income allocations, thereby creating further potential
instances of double taxation.277
Whether or not the measures included in the new regulations are
implicitly or explicitly sanctioned by international interpretations of
the arm's length standard, any abstract grant of permission to im-
plement these measures is of little help if the measures conflict with
the transfer pricing practices of trading partners. 278 A transfer pric-
ing adjustment that is disregarded by the tax authorities of a foreign
affiliate creates not only double taxation problems for the taxpayer
but also treaty problems for the countries involved. 279
D. The Potential for Conflict with Foreign Tax Systems
From an international perspective, the problem with the new U.S.
regulatory scheme may be that it is ahead of its time. For example,
Canada, the largest U.S. trading partner,280 only recently adopted
transfer pricing provisions that specifically apply the suggestions of
the OECD.28' Similarly, Japan relies primarily on the comparable
277. See Japan Foreign Trade Council, supra note 276, at 1306 (reporting Japanese fear of
resulting double taxation under new regulations and noting Japanese suggestion that new
regulations should be implemented only after foreign states have entered into appropriate
agreements).
278. See OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 9, at 30 (suggesting that discrep-
ancies between national transfer pricing policies may result in double taxation).
279. See OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 9, at 30 (asserting that where one
contracting state has made transfer pricing allocation, other shall make proper adjustment,
and that disagreement with transfer pricing policy of partner to treaty therefore leads inescap-
ably to difficulties under article 9 of OECD Model Convention).
280. See Paul S. Dempsey et al., Canadian Transport Liberalization: Planes, Trains, Trucks &
Buses RollingAcross the Great White North, 19 TRANSP. L.J. 113, 179 (1990) (asserting that Canada
and United States are each other's largest trading partner).
281. See International Transfer Pricing and Other International Transactions, 2 Can. Inc. Tax
Guide (CCH) 51,252 (Feb. 27, 1987) (encouraging primary reliance on comparable uncon-
trolled price method, but also permitting use of cost plus and resale price methods in con-
junction with functional analysis; also permitting resort to other methods based on functional
analysis); see also John A. Calderwood, Pricing for Intangibles, Goods and Services Under Super-Roy-
alty: A Canadian View, in TRANSFER PRICING FOR INTANGIBLES: A COMMENTARY ON THE WHITE
PAPER 51, 52-53 (Fred C. de Hosson ed., 1989) (indicating that Canada's Information Circular
provides "pecking order" with respect to transfer of goods while Canadian Income Tax Act
does not); 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 13-14 (discussing application of comparable
uncontrolled price, cost plus, resale price, and other methods for valuing intercompany trans-
fers).
Canada's application of transfer pricing adjustments occurs only in the case of outbound non-
arm's length transfers, or transfers in which a Canadian entity has either paid too much or
received too little consideration for its transfer. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., ch. 63, § 69(2)
(1970-1972) (Can.) (permitting allocation when taxpayer in Canada has paid or agreed to pay
to nonresident amount greater than that which would have been appropriate had transaction
been at arm's length); idL § 69(3) (permitting allocation when nonresident has paid or agreed
to pay to taxpayer reasonable arm's length amount even when nonresident has not dealt with
taxpayer at arm's length).
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uncontrolled price, cost plus, and resale price methods, 28 2 resorting
to other methods such as rate of return or profit split only where
necessary. 28 3 Finally, some foreign commentary on the White Paper
asserted vehemently that unilateral adoption of such measures will
effectively repudiate U.S. treaty obligations. 28 4 More than any
other, this fact indicates that conflict will most certainly occur under
the new regulations. When treaty partners disagree over the "cor-
rect" interpretation of arm's length prices, double taxation is the
most probable result.285
III. RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES ARISING OVER TRANSFER
PRICING ADJUSTMENTS
Notwithstanding any argument that the new regulations comply
with the arm's length standard, international authorities have recog-
nized problems inherent in unilateral application of such regula-
tions.28 6 When double taxation occurs, it creates problems
involving not only a single aggrieved taxpayer and its government,
but also bilateral relations. 28 7 To eliminate international double
taxation conflicts, a taxpayer may either avoid double taxation by
way of a prior understanding 288 or correct the problem after it has
occurred. 28 9
The first alternative, commonly referred to as a safe harbor, pro-
282. See Kawada, supra note 270, at 62 (reporting that primary methods used byJapan are
comparable uncontrolled price, cost plus, and resale price methods).
283. See Kawada, supra note 270, at 62 (suggesting that rate of return and profit split anal-
yses should be used only as tools to check validity of adjustments made under one of primary
methods, and asserting that "[ilt is dangerous to rely too much" on fourth methods). Id.
284. See, e.g., Bellstedt, supra note 156, at 69 (asserting that BALRM and periodic adjust-
ments are "another sad example for the preparedness of the United States to disregard inter-
national treaty obligations").
285. See OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 25, at 42 (noting that double taxa-
tion may result from disagreements between countries on transfer pricing policies).
286. The OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs points out:
[T]he varied activities of any [multinational enterprise] and the varied circumstances
and situations in which they are carried on must make it impracticable for the tax
authorities of the country in which one subsidiary is situated to judge in any satisfac-
tory manner the profitability of any of the other parts of the group situated else-
where. Moreover, problems would still arise in the comparison of figures produced
in different countries by different accounting methods and different legal require-
ments. [Such methods'] unco-ordinated use by the tax authorities of several coun-
tries would involve the danger that, overall, the [multinational enterprise] affected
would suffer double taxation of its profits.
1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 15.
287. See OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 25, at 42 (calling not only for relief
for aggrieved taxpayer, but also for reconciliation of bilateral relations by requiring con-
tracting states to endeavor to resolve dispute over convention interpretation).
288. See infra notes 316-32 and accompanying text (discussing advance pricing
agreements).
289. See infra notes 292-315, 333-47 and accompanying text (discussing post factumn reme-
dies available through competent authority negotiations and arbitration).
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vides the taxpayer with assurance that it will not suffer double taxa-
tion if it satisfies certain requirements. 290 The second alternative,
bilateral dispute resolution, which currently is limited to interna-
tional negotiation but which may eventually include meaningful
binding arbitration, provides a basis for international agreements
on specific tax issues. 291 Despite the existence of some safe harbors
and dispute resolution measures, however, these recent develop-
ments still lack the potential for much more than a case-by-case
means for settling the problem of double taxation.
A. Existing and Proposed Means for Avoiding and Resolving
Double Taxation
1. Competent authority negotiation
In the absence of bilaterally approved transfer pricing measures,
current international policy calls for negotiation between the com-
petent tax authorities of the involved countries.292 The competent
authority procedure has been adopted by the United States in its
290. See supra note 247-52 and accompanying text (discussing inclusion of safe harbor
provision in temporary regulations); see also infra notes 316-32 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing advance pricing agreements).
291. SeeJuergen Killius, The ECArbitration Convention, 1990 INTERTAX 437, 437-38 (review-
ing history of multilateral arbitration provisions for tax conflicts, suggesting that arbitration
represents step toward multilateral cooperation on double taxation issues, and noting recent
treaty negotiations that would permit bilateral arbitration if both states agree); cf Council
Directive 77/799, pmbl., 1977 OJ. (L 336) 15, 15-16 (articulating policy of combating double
taxation through mutual assistance and information exchange by competent authorities).
292. See OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 25, at 42 (providing taxpayer with
recourse to competent authorities when facing taxation that contravenes Convention); U.N.
MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 25, at 40 (duplicating language of OECD Model Con-
vention). Article 25 of the OECD Model Convention provides:
1. Where a person considers that the actions of one or both of the Contracting
States result or will result for him [or her] in taxation not in accordance with the
provisions of this Convention, he [or she] may, irrespective of the remedies provided
by the domestic law of those States, present his [or her] case to the competent au-
thority of the Contracting State of which he [or she] is a resident or .... to that of the
Contracting State of which he [or she] is a national....
2. The competent authority shall endeavor, if the objection appears to it to bejusti-
fied and if it is not itself able to arrive at a satisfactory solution, to resolve the case by
mutual agreement with the competent authority of the other Contracting State, with
a view to the avoidance of taxation which is not in accordance with the
Convention....
3. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall endeavor to resolve by
mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation or appli-
cation of the Convention. They may also consult together for the elimination of
double taxation in cases not provided for in the Convention.
OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 25, at 42; see also Pending Bilateral Tax Treaties
and OECD Tax Convention: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 20 (1990) (prepared statement of Kenneth R. Gideon, assistant secretary for Tax Policy,
U.S. Treasury Department) ("A major benefit of an income tax treaty is the establishment of a
bilateral dispute mechanism through competent authority agreement.").
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own bilateral tax treaties. 293 According to this procedure, taxpayers
may avoid double taxation and resort to the competent authorities
if, in light of a transfer pricing adjustment made by the tax authority
of one country, the other country's tax authority is willing to offset
the adjustment by making a "corresponding adjustment. ' 294 Ordi-
narily, however, corresponding adjustments are available only when
both competent authorities recognize that the conditions of a con-
trolled transfer significantly depart from arm's length.295
A taxpayer facing double taxation in excess of the corresponding
adjustments that domestic law permits may first appeal to the judi-
cial procedures available in its own country296 in hopes of obtaining
a readjustment of its domestic income allocation. 297 When a tax-
payer seeks to assert that the double taxation violates a bilateral tax
treaty, however, the Tax Court may be powerless to grant relief.298
293. See, e.g., Tax Convention with the Federal Republic of Germany, art. 25(1), S. TREATY
Doc. No. 10, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1990) [hereinafter U.S.-Germany Tax Convention]
(adopting substance of article 25(1) of U.S. Model Convention permitting resort to competent
authorities in cases of double taxation); Income Tax Convention, Apr. 25, 1980, U.S.-U.K.,
art. 25(1), 31 U.S.T. 5668, 5688 (granting taxpayers right to present cases of double taxation
to competent authorities as in U.S. Model Convention article 25(1)); see also U.S. Model Conven-
tion, supra note 11, art. 25, at 10,583 (providing in article 25 that "[w]here a person considers
that the actions of one or both of the contracting states result or will result for him [or her] in
[double] taxation he [or she] may... present his [or her] case to competent authority of the
contracting state of which he [or she] is a resident or national"); Nancy H. Kaufman, Dispute
Resolution Under Tax Treaties: The Developing Role of the Competent Authority, 1984 WIS. INT'L LJ.
101, 102 (noting that competent authority provisions exist in most bilateral tax treaties).
294. See Ian Hunter, Double Taxation-Dispute Resolutions Through Competent Authority, in
TRANSFER PRICING FOR INTANGIBLES: A COMMENTARY ON THE WHITE PAPER 64, 65 (Fred C. de
Hosson ed., 1989) (observing that income allocation by one country will effect double taxa-
tion unless other country makes corresponding adjustment); see also 1984 OECD REPORT,
supra note 11, at 9 (discussing utility of corresponding adjustments).
In most cases, two countries' assertion ofjurisdiction to tax the same income will be offset
automatically by a national statutory provision such as a foreign tax exemption or foreign tax
credit. See Roin, supra note 11, at 923-26 (illustrating operation of automatic corresponding
adjustment mechanisms such as foreign tax exemption and foreign tax credit); see also Kauf-
man, supra note 293, at 106-08 (noting foreign tax credit provisions of Internal Revenue
Code). Article 23 of the U.S. Model Convention incorporates the foreign tax credit provi-
sions of I.R.C. § 901. See U.S. Model Convention, supra note 11, art. 23, at 10,582 (incorporating
offsetting tax credit provisions); see also I.R.C. § 901 (1988) (setting forth provisions for for-
eign tax credits).
295. See Hunter, supra note 294, at 69 (suggesting that transfer pricing allocation must
address dramatic related-party pricing discrepancy before qualifying for negotiated corre-
sponding adjustment).
296. See Kaufman, supra note 293, at 112 (noting that domestic proceedings are taxpayer's
first recourse in attempting to remedy problem of double taxation).
297. In the United States this would mean a petition to the Tax Court. See, e.g., Sunds-
trand Corp. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 226, 226 (1991) (petitioning Tax Court for review of
§ 482 tax adjustments made by IRS); Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 525, 525
(1989) (challenging IRS's transfer pricing allocations); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Commissioner, 84
T.C. 996, 996 (1985) (contesting IRS allocations by petition to Tax Court).
298. See Filler v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 406, 408 (1980) (holding that U.S. Tax Court has
no jurisdiction to adjudicate claims for relief of double taxation under U.S.-France Conven-
tion). The court in Filler examined the complaint of a French citizen whose U.S. income was
taxed in both the United States and France. Id. at 406. Although the court admitted that
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Once a taxpayer has exhausted its domestic avenues for relief,2 99 it
may initiate the competent authority procedure, provided that a
treaty exists between the taxpayer's country of domicile and the in-
volved foreign country.300
The competent authority procedure is essentially a diplomatic
process,30 but it need not utilize standard diplomatic channels. 30 2
Regardless of the means, however, its purpose is to conform one
treaty partner's income allocations to the terms of its treaty.303 In-
sofar as the negotiation between the competent authorities may re-
quire interpretation of the treaty in question,30 4 the competent
double taxation had occurred, it determined that its jurisdiction extended only to the propri-
ety of the assessment of U.S. income tax, id. at 408, and reasoned that if the petitioner were
permitted a tax credit under the U.S.-France Income Tax Treaty, that credit could be granted
only by France. Id at 411.
Filler suggests that the fact that the United States is unable to provide relief does not pre-
clude relief, but that it is more appropriate for a taxpayer's country of residence to remedy the
problem. See, e.g., U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, supra note 293, at 61-64 (providing tax
credits where taxpayer's income is subject to tax by two nations); Convention with Respect to
Taxes on Income and Property, July 28, 1967, U.S.-Fr., art. 23, 19 U.S.T. 5281, 5309-10
[hereinafter Double Taxation Convention] (providing that foreign tax credit may be granted
only by taxpayer's country of domicile); U.S. Model Convention, supra note 11, art. 23, at 10,582
(providing tax credits to U.S. taxpayers subject to double taxation). A taxpayer situated like
the petitioner in Filler could therefore face the prospect of seeking relief through the judicial
systems of both countries, although familiarity with the treaty obligations of one's country
would obviate such duplication. Nonetheless, inclusion of the treaty partner as a party to
domestic litigation would eliminate the need, or indeed the possibility, for duplication.
299. See Rev. Proc. 91-23, 1991-1 C.B. 534, 539 (curtailing access to competent authority
when case is pending before U.S. Tax Court). This does not mean, however, that a taxpayer
may not invoke competent authority assistance before instituting an action in a domestic
court. See id. (permitting severance of issues pending in judicial proceeding prior to initiating
competent authority procedure).
300. See id. at 536 (prescribing recourse to competent authority only in double taxation
disputes involving tax treaty partner). When a taxpayer has not sought competent authority
assistance, the assistant commissioner of Internal Revenue (International) may initiate negoti-
ations to protect economic interests. Id. at 535. Such a case could arise where a taxpayer has
accepted double taxation as a result of income allocation that conflicts with an applicable
income tax treaty. Id
301. See Edwin Reavey & William Dunn, Resolving Transfer-Pricing Disputes Through the Re-
vised Competent Authority Process, 43 TAx EXECrIVE 177, 178 (1991) (characterizing competent
authority as diplomatic means of enforcing tax treaties).
302. See, e.g., U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, supra note 293, at 69 (authorizing direct
communication between representatives of competent authorities); OECD MODEL CONVEN-
TION, supra note 12, art. 25 cmt., para. 4, at 175 (asserting that Convention merely contem-
plates that competent authorities will communicate directly with one another and not through
diplomatic channels); U.S. Model Convention, supra note 11, art. 25, at 10,583 (permitting direct
communication between competent authorities).
303. See OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 25, at 42 (compelling competent
authorities to correct double taxation not in accordance with Convention); U.S. Model Conven-
tion, supra note 11, art. 25, at 10,583 (duplicating language of OECD Model Convention).
304. See OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 25, at 42 (requiring that compe-
tent authorities attempt to reach agreement as to proper application or interpretation of Con-
vention); U.S. Model Convention, supra note 11, art. 25, at 10,583 (calling for mutual agreement
on treaty interpretation); see also 1984 OECD REPORT, supra note 11, at 38 (providing that
contracting state should not agree to corresponding adjustment unless other competent au-
thority proves that its transfer pricing allocation correctly reflects arm's length
considerations).
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authorities need not reach agreement8 0 5 In fact, provisions of the
competent authorities' domestic law may prohibit their accession to
a disagreeable compromise.306 Furthermore, a taxpayer need not
accept the terms of a competent authority agreement even if one is
reached.30 7
The limits of competent authority procedures are readily appar-
ent. First, invocation of competent authority implies an effort by the
taxpayer to persuade one country to modify its own tax policy by
agreeing to a corresponding adjustment.308 Second, and more im-
portantly, such an indirect request for a corresponding adjustment
implicitly challenges a treaty partner's transfer pricing policy.3 0 9
Third, in any resort to competent authority procedures, at least
three parties, including the two competing tax jurisdictions and the
aggrieved taxpayer, share a vested interest in the outcome.310 Un-
fortunately, the foreign tax authority is absent from a domestic tax
adjudication, the taxpayer is absent from competent authority nego-
tiations, and no party has any means to bring all three parties to-
gether.31' Thus, domestic adjudications are not binding on a
305. Cf OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 25, at 42 (indicating that compe-
tent authorities "shall endeavor" to reach agreement but not requiring that agreement be
reached); U.S. Model Convention, supra note 11, art. 25, at 10,583 (adopting language of OECD
Model Convention).
306. See Mogle, supra note 6, at 726 (observing that conflicting domestic forces may pre-
vent agreement).
307. See Rev. Proc. 91-23, 1991-1 C.B. 534, 541 (permitting petitioner to withdraw, post
factum, request for competent authority assistance and to seek alternative relief); Mogle, supra
note 6, at 726 (noting that taxpayer is always free to reject results of competent authority
negotiations).
308. See Rev. Proc. 91-23, 1991-1 C.B. at 541 ("Mhe primary goal of the U.S. competent
authority . . . is to obtain a correlative adjustment from the treaty country."). Where one
country has already collected its tax, however, it will naturally be reluctant to refund it. Mo-
gle, supra note 6, at 726.
309. See Mogle, supra note 6, at 726-27 (observing that arm's length methodologies gener-
ally come down to judgment of national tax authority and that competent authority negotia-
tions question that judgment).
310. See Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 349 (providing that any determination of
transfer pricing adjustment shares same parties in interest, which are (1) domestic tax author-
ity making determination; (2) foreign tax authority that may need to alter its own determina-
tion based on domestic determination (and thereby face potential revenue loss); and (3) party
who must pay taxes on agreed transfer price).
311. See Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 349 (noting that no existing dispute reso-
lution procedure brings all parties in interest to table); see also infra notes 362-64 and accom-
panying text (proposing trilateral dispute resolution). But see Mogle, supra note 6, at 727-30
(discussing proactive participation in competent authority procedure by taxpayer). Proactive
participation by a taxpayer generally involves presenting the arguments of a taxpayer and a
taxpayer's representatives to both competent authorities. Mogle, supra note 6, at 728. Mogle
suggests that proactive participation provides three benefits. First, it permits a taxpayer to
influence the competent authorities' decisions independent of face-to-face meetings between
competent authorities. Id. Second, because a taxpayer necessarily has a far better under-
standing of the facts of its case, it is in a much better position to explain the arm's length
nature of a proposed income allocation. Id. Finally, the independent interest that a taxpayer
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foreign tax jurisdiction,3 12 and successful competent authority
agreements are not binding on a dissatisfied taxpayer.3 13 Finally,
competent authority agreements and the negotiations preceding
them are confidential. 314 This confidentiality results in no meaning-
ful agreement between governments because it provides no basis
either for tax planning or for informed tax enforcement. 315
2. Advance pricing agreements
One way a taxpayer could secure a safe harbor, or positive assur-
ance against unexpected transfer pricing allocations,3 1 6 would be to
obtain a preliminary agreement from its own competent authority as
has in the resolution of the competent authority process ensures that it will be able to dedicate
more resources to the negotiation than could the competent authorities themselves. Id.
At the same time, proactive participation in the competent authority procedure could preju-
dice a taxpayer in subsequent domestic litigation because, to be effective in proactive partici-
pation, a taxpayer must be willing to support the disputed transfer pricing allocation. Id. at
729. This threshold requirement would effectively preclude domestic litigation if the compe-
tent authorities failed to agree on an allocation because support for a domestic competent
authority's position would be nearly impossible to disavow before the Tax Court. Id.
312. See Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 349 (indicating that because domestic
court cannot interplead foreign tax authority, foreign tax authority will not be subject to do-
mestic adjudications).
313. See supra note 307 and accompanying text (discussing taxpayer's right to reject
agreement).
314. See Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 354 (noting that neither competent author-
ity agreements nor rationales for accepting or rejecting agreements are made public).
315. See Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 361 (advocating modified bilateral and
multilateral standards for competent authority procedures that are open and bear some mea-
sure of precedential effect). Measures to make the procedures public were proposed in 1965
by Stanley Surrey, assistant secretary of the U.S. Treasury Department for Tax Policy. Mr.
Surrey observed:
Mhe rules which the United States regards as proper to allocate income to our par-
ent companies from transactions with their foreign subsidiaries are the rules we must
be willing to accept when the subsidiary is here and its parent is a foreign corpora-
tion. This factor should have an effect in tempering the international assertion of
rigid positions, and thus make it easier to achieve international accommodation. For
it is clear that this must be the ultimate goal, an internationally acceptable set of
rational rules to govern the allocation of international income arising through these
transactions.
Stanley Surrey, Address to the Tax Institute of America (Dec. 1965), quoted in Langbein, supra
note 34, at 647.
316. See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 16-17 (discussing efficacy of safe harbors).
In addressing the possibility of creating safe harbors from income allocations, the OECD re-
served its approval for fixed safe harbors, or standardized ranges within which a taxpayer's
transfer prices would receive automatic acceptance, because such rules would be unavoidably
arbitrary. See id. (contending that fixed-range safe harbors "are likely to be arbitrary since
they will rarely fit exactly the varying circumstances even of enterprises in the same trade or
business"). When it addressed the topic in the White Paper, the IRS similarly noted that
"[t]he government's experience in the section 482 area has been that safe harbors have gener-
ally treated amounts as arm's length prices that were usually different from market rates."
White Paper, supra note 59, at 481. Asserting that developing safe harbors under § 482 would
require constant reference to the variable factual conditions of § 482 cases, the IRS resisted
recommending inclusion of safe harbors in the revised regulations. See id. at 482 (noting safe
harbor deficiencies and reserving favorable recommendation). But see Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.482-IT(0(1), 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5281 (1993) (providing optional safe harbor for small
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to the methodologies that both taxpayer and tax authority would
apply with respect to the taxpayer's transfer pricing. Such a proce-
dure, referred to as an "advanced pricing agreement" (APA), was
recently authorized by the IRS.3 17
The purpose of an APA is simply to establish an arrangement be-
tween a taxpayer and the competent authority as to the tax treat-
ment of the taxpayer's controlled transactions.318 In so doing, the
procedure sets forth the methodology that will be used to allocate
income earned in the relevant transfers3 19 with direct reference to
the specific nature of those transfers.3 20 In most cases, the APA will
also preset appropriate transfer prices.3 21 In addition, the APA pro-
cedure provides means for obtaining bilateral competent authority
agreement in advance of any double taxation problems. 322
An APA is binding on both the taxpayer and the IRS, 323 and a
taxpayer who complies with the APA's terms is free from unex-
pected IRS allocations.3 24 Nonetheless, the IRS, as a competent au-
thority, may deviate from the terms of an APA if necessary to bring
about a subsequent competent authority agreement.3 25 Unfortu-
nately, APAs, like competent authority procedures, are kept confi-
dential.3 26 At the same time, the IRS reportedly is "sensitive to
charges of creating a private body of law"3 27 and has suggested that
it may make public the considerations relevant to APA negotiations
taxpayers); see also supra notes 247-52 and accompanying text (discussing temporary regula-
tions' safe harbor provision).
317. See Rev. Proc. 91-22, 1991-1 C.B. 526, 526-34 (detailing advance pricing agreement
procedure).
318. See id. at 527 (explaining principles underlying APA provisions).
319. See id, (seeking agreement on appropriate transfer pricing methodology).
320. See id. (providing for stipulation on factual nature of related-party transfers).
321. See id. (noting that advance allocation will be omitted from APA only "in appropriate
cases").
322. See id. (providing for preemptive consultation on contents of APA between compe-
tent authorities of treaty partners). If the competent authorities fail to agree on the terms of
the APA or any corresponding adjustments thereto, the taxpayer must provide "good and
sufficient" reasons for executing the APA without the treaty partners' accession. See id. at 531
(discussing appropriate circumstances for continuing APA negotiations in absence of compe-
tent authority agreement).
323. Idt at 531.
324. Cf. id. at 532-33 (providing for IRS examination to verify taxpayer compliance with
APA terms).
325. See it at 531 (noting that if "double taxation occurs, the U.S. competent authority
may deviate from the terms and conditions of the APA in an attempt to negotiate a settle-
ment" with treaty partner's competent authority). This deviation can occur only if the tax-
payer has not obtained prior competent authority agreement on the terms of the APA. See
supra note 322 and accompanying text (discussing preemptive negotiation of competent au-
thority agreement).
326. See John Turro, IRS Official Says No APA Disclosure, But Generic Information To Be Pro-
vided, 4 TAx NoTEs INT'L 709, 709 (1992) (reporting comments by IRS Associate Chief Coun-
sel Robert Culbertson that APAs are not disclosed to public).
327. Id.
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and the approaches that work best with respect to certain types of
transactions.3 28
Preliminary industry experience with the APA has been generally
positive.3 29 Furthermore, competent authority negotiations over
APAs have yielded some substantial, if informal, international
agreements.330 Unfortunately, the secrecy of advance pricing agree-
ments is extremely troubling. Not only does the lack of open proce-
dures and transfer pricing agreements leave the taxpayer without
significant guidance in presenting its case for an APA,33' but it also
provides a punitive approach toward transfer pricing that could pe-
nalize foreign taxpayers while protecting U.S. concerns. 332
3. Arbitration
The existing arrangement seems to cry out for impartial arbitra-
tion. In fact, the OECD Model Convention permits competent au-
thorities to resort to arbitration when they are unable to reach an
appropriate agreement. 333 Unfortunately, the OECD Convention's
suggestion has been followed rarely, if at all. 334 Bilateral income tax
treaties have begun to include arbitration provisions, 335 however,
328. Id
329. See, e.g., John Turro, Apple Computer Readies for APA Replay, 4 TAX NoTEs INT'L 278,
278 (1992) (noting that Apple's experience, which shows that preparation for initial APA pro-
vides groundwork for negotiation of subsequent agreements, is demonstrative of industry-
wide positive experience with APAs).
330. See id at 279 (reporting that IRS has so far concluded advance pricing agreements
relating to Japan, Canada, United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Australia). Negotiations are
apparently under way with Norway, the Netherlands, Germany, Singapore, Hong Kong, and,
notably, Brazil, which is not a U.S. tax treaty partner. Id
331. See Turro, supra note 329, at 278 (discussing Apple's laborious process in preparing
to negotiate first-time pricing agreement and noting that lack of information regarding discus-
sions between IRS and foreign tax authorities contributed to difficulty of process).
332. See Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 354 (asserting that secret negotiation
leaves open possibility for unfair treatment of foreign companies involved in APA requests).
333. See OECD MODEL CONVENTON, supra note 12, art. 25 cmt., paras. 43-45, at 182 (ob-
serving occasion when competent authorities may seek independent advisory opinion of inter-
national organization or independent arbitrators).
334. See 1984 OECD REPORT, supra note 11, at 18 (commenting that because no one has
taken advantage of arbitration opportunities, it is difficult to ascertain how useful they might
be).
335. See Killius, supra note 291, at 438-39 (discussing inclusion of arbitration provisions in
income tax treaties between Germany and Sweden and United States and Germany). Treaty-
based arbitration should not be confused with voluntary referral to arbitration from the U.S.
Tax Court. Tax Court rule 124 provides that the parties to an issue before the court may
move to submit the issue to binding arbitration. TAx CT. R.P. 124(a). Because the rule is
limited to matters over which the Tax Court has jurisdiction, however, such arbitration is
inapplicable to international double taxation disputes. See supra note 298 and accompanying
text (discussing power of Tax Court and Tax Court's decision in Fillerv. Commissioner). Parties
have invoked rule 124 only recently and only in one § 482 dispute. SeeJohn E. O'Grady, Apple
and IRS Enter into First Transfer-Pricing Arbitration Under U.S. Tax Court Rule, 4 TAx NoTEs INT'L
518, 518 (1992) (observing that Apple case involved first referral of § 482 dispute to
arbitration).
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and arbitration may prove to be an excellent vehicle for resolving
the confusion that will doubtless result from the new U.S. regula-
tions. The United States-Germany Tax Convention, for example,
adopts the arbitration measures suggested by the OECD Model
Convention.3 36 Although it prescribes impartial arbitration only by
agreement of all three parties in interest,33 7 voluntary arbitration
occupies the middle ground between a competent authority stale-
mate and the subordination of fiscal self-determination through ac-
cession to a corresponding adjustment. 338
The arbitration provision in the United States-Germany Tax Con-
vention is an excellent first step if only because it brings all three
interested parties to the same table. Although a trilateral settlement
may be procedurally cumbersome, such a scheme doubtless pro-
vides the most equitable result possible because it permits simulta-
neous consideration of the concerns of all parties involved. 3s 9
Moreover, although it does not carry full precedential effect, 40 the
arbitration is binding.341
In observance of the problems of double taxation, the European
Community (EC) followed the OECD Model Convention's sugges-
tion and agreed in 1990 to a draft double taxation convention that
336. See U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, supra note 293, art. 25(5), at 69 (permitting sub-
mission of unresolved disagreements to arbitration on mutual agreement of competent au-
thorities); see also supra note 333 and accompanying text (discussing arbitration provision in
OECD Model Convention). The protocol to article 25(5) of the U.S.-Germany Tax Conven-
tion provides:
The competent authorities may agree to invoke arbitration in a specific case only
after fully exhausting [competent authority negotiations], and if the taxpayer(s) con-
sent(s) to the arbitration and agree(s) in writing to be bound by the arbitration deci-
sion. The competent authorities will not generally accede to arbitration with respect
to matters concerning the tax policy or domestic tax law of either Contracting State.
Letter from Vernon A. Walters, U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, to Dr.
Hans Werner Lautenschlager, State Secretary of the Foreign Office (Aug. 29, 1989), reprinted
in U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, supra note 293, at 16.
337. See Killius, supra note 291, at 439 (noting decision of German Government to estab-
lish arbitration procedure requiring consent of all parties rather than to require mandatory
arbitration).
338. See 1984 OECD REPORT, supra note 11, at 39 (rejecting compulsory arbitration be-
cause "adoption of such a procedure would represent an unacceptable surrender of fiscal
sovereignty"). But see Convention 90/463 on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connec-
tion with the Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises, art. 7(1), 1990 OJ. (L 225) 10,
13 [hereinafter EC Arbitration Convention] (compelling arbitration under prescribed
circumstances).
339. See infra notes 362-64 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of trilateral dis-
pute resolution process).
340. See U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, supra note 293, at 18 (stating that arbitral deci-
sions are not precedential). Nonetheless, the diplomatic exchanges accompanying the treaty
provide that such arbitral decisions "may . . . be taken into account in other cases where
appropriate." Id.
341. U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, supra note 293, at 94 ("The decision of the arbitra-
tion board in a particular case shall be binding on both Contracting States with respect to that
case.").
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provides for binding arbitration.3 42 What is most notable about the
EC Arbitration Convention is the openness of its procedures. When
a contracting state intends to make an arm's length adjustment, the
state must provide the taxpayer with timely notification of its inten-
tions and allow it to inform its related party so as to permit the re-
lated party an opportunity to notify the other contracting state.343 If
the initial communication of intent fails to elicit an agreement, a tax-
payer is free to invoke competent authority proceedings generally
by the means set forth in the OECD Model Convention. 344 Finally,
if the competent authorities fail to settle the dispute within two
years,3 45 they must refer the dispute to an "advisory commission,"
or arbitral tribunal.3 46 The arbitration will become binding six
months after its delivery unless the competent authorities agree to a
contrary settlement before that time.3 47
B. The Limits of Unilateral Enforcement and Bilateral Dispute Resolution
Although they are a last resort for a taxpayer who faces double
taxation,3 48 competent authority proceedings offer some hope for
encouraging international agreement on a new international trans-
fer pricing standard. Admittedly, the new § 482 regulations come
342. See EC Arbitration Convention, supra note 338, at 10-16 (acknowledging importance
of elimination of double taxation in effecting Convention and including binding arbitration in
Convention's provisions).
343. EC Arbitration Convention, supra note 338, art. 5, at 13. Although this provision is
not particularly dramatic, its effects are important. First, it provides an open, if indirect, line
of communication through which contracting states may voice their interpretations of arm's
length before double taxation problems manifest. By providing the treaty partner of a coun-
try making an adjustment with an opportunity to review the adjustment and make an informed
corresponding adjustment, the Convention may prevent the partner's need to resort to inter-
national negotiation. See id. (precluding application of competent authority proceedings and
arbitration if contracting states agree to corresponding adjustment). Further, such communi-
cation may in time bring about bilateral and multilateral understanding and agreement on
general transfer pricing principles. See Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 361 (positing
that making proceedings public will be beneficial to all involved and discussing ways to ac-
complish openness).
344. EC Arbitration Convention, supra note 338, art. 6, at 13; see OECD MODEL CONVEN-
TION, supra note 12, art. 25, at 42 (providing recourse to competent authority).
345. EC Arbitration Convention, supra note 338, art. 7(l), at 13. This time limit may be
waived by mutual agreement of both competent authorities and the affected taxpayer. Id.
346. EC Arbitration Convention, supra note 338, art. 7(1), at 13. The arbitral panel is
empowered to demand documents from any party to the dispute. See id art. 10(1), at 14
(permitting arbitral panel to require any documentation that does not implicate state secrets
or economic security). The taxpayer may appear at either the tribunal's request or its own
initiative. lId art. 10(2), at 14-15.
347. EC Arbitration Convention, supra note 338, art. 12(1), at 15.
348. See OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 25 cmt.,para. 6, at 175 (comment-
ing that taxpayer facing double taxation must first litigate in each country involved before
instituting competent authority proceedings).
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in the wake of perceived revenue losses in the United States,3 49 and
they may appear to be coercive, forcing confusing pricing standards
down the throats of taxpayers and foreign tax authorities alike. 50
Nonetheless, the regulations' methodology is unbiased. If applied
bilaterally rather than unilaterally, the regulations would stand as
much chance of diverting related-party income to a foreign jurisdic-
tion as to the United States.351 Although competent authority pro-
ceedings and arbitration may provide short-term assistance in
alleviating acute problems, such case-by-case resolution will not
solve the underlying problem of discordant transfer pricing poli-
cies.3 52 Nonetheless, even though the essential problem is properly
the subject for bilateral treaty negotiations, individual cases may
provide a basis on which to build international understanding of
what is at stake in transfer pricing.
C. The Next Step
Any solution to the problem of double taxation cannot be reached
unilaterally. Regardless of the accuracy or even celestial perfection
of any one nation's transfer pricing methodology, double taxation
will still result if other nations do not agree with that methodol-
ogy.353 The best that can be said is that the elimination of double
taxation will require multilateral consensus.3 54 Obtaining such in-
ternational consensus, however, depends on a number of factors
that do not exist within the current international system.3 55
349. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress amended
§ 482 in 1986 in part because of revenue loss perception).
350. Cf Bellstedt, supra note 156, at 66 (reporting that author, German and international
tax practitioner, had read White Paper "with great interest and indeed with a mixture of
amusement and horror").
351. See Boidman, supra note 141, at 420 (opining that new U.S. regulations would apply
equally to inbound and outbound transfers); cf Stanley Surrey, Address to the Tax Institute of
America (Dec. 1965), quoted in Langbein, supra note 34, at 647 (asserting that United States
should be willing to accept countervailing adjustments equivalent to those imposed by U.S.
regulation).
352. See Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 341 (asserting that case-by-case analysis
under current system "is a horse-and-buggy mechanism that is woefully inadequate to the
demands being made on it").
353. See Stanley Surrey, Address to the Tax Institute of America (Dec. 1965), quoted in
Langbein, supra note 34, at 647 ("[I]f our unilateral rules do not mesh with those of other
countries the result will be double taxation, the tax burden of which will be borne either by
one government through the foreign tax credit or by the taxpayer, with the other government
obtaining an unwarranted benefit.").
354. Cf Council Directive 77/799, pmbl., 1977 OJ. (L 336) 15, 15-16 (declaring necessity
for mutual cooperation to perfect uniform transfer pricing rules).
355. For example, nothing in the existing systems for dispute resolution compels agree-
ment between competent authorities. Although the U.S.-Germany Tax Treaty and the EC
Arbitration Convention do provide for binding arbitration, the arbitration provisions of those
conventions are not mandatory. See, e.g., EC Arbitration Convention, supra note 338, art. 7(1),
at 13 (permitting but not requiring parties to resort to arbitration, results of which are bind-
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As the aforementioned suggests, potential international discord
arising over one country's application of specific, unilateral transfer
pricing rules may be ameliorated by altering those rules.3 56 The ul-
timate solution, however, may be reached only by international
agreement on uniform rules.3 57 Regardless of international accept-
ance of the arm's length standard, the standard is not an end in it-
self, but a means.358 That is, "arm's length" does nothing more
than provide a rational basis on which to establish which country
may claim the right to certain tax revenues.3 59 The differences of
opinion between tax jurisdictions therefore represent little more
than differences as to what the term "arm's length" actually means.
This is not to say that the method used to determine an arm's length
price is irrelevant, but that determination of arm's length market
pricing is still inferior to the goal of geographically allocating reve-
nue among competing tax jurisdictions.3 60 The new § 482 regula-
tions appear to be on the right track if only because of their
meticulous use of data derived from transactions among unrelated
parties.3 61 Nonetheless, they are derailed by their focus on the op-
eration of allocating income among related parties rather than allo-
cating revenue among the nations in which those related parties
reside.
1. Triangulating the dispute resolution process
The first step in obtaining multilateral agreement would be to
permit all parties in interest to a transfer pricing allocation to pres-
ent their views in domestic, international, or competent authority
proceedings. From a governmental perspective, permission to enter
ing); U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, supra note 293, art. 25(5), at 69, 94 (implementing bind-
ing, albeit voluntary, arbitration procedures).
356. See Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 356-57 (suggesting that administrative or
legislative actions by United States could solve some problems relating to international trans-
fer pricing disputes).
357. See Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 357 (suggesting that international agree-
ment on unified rules is only sure solution to international discord). Wickham and Kerester
posit that international agreements regarding the fairness of apportioning the proceeds from
international business transactions among the countries involved would be most helpful. Id.
358. See supra notes 22-39 and accompanying text (discussing principles motivating use of
arm's length standard).
359. See Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 342-43 (asserting that geographic source
of income, not arbitrary arm's length standard, is proper basis for allocating income among
countries).
360. See Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 342 (contending that concentration on
allocation methods ignores source issues).
361. See 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5264-65 (1993) (comments to temporary regulations) (ex-
plaining how regulations implement and construct CPI and noting that regulations require
that results from resale price, cost plus, and other methods fall within CPI); see also King, supra
note 173, at 336-37 (describing CPI in terms of series of small-scale operations derived from
quantifiable third-party activities).
1209
1210 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [
the domestic proceedings of another country would not only permit
the views of one country's competent authority to be heard in a for-
eign forum, but would also grant valuable insight into the operation
of foreign transfer pricing mechanisms. Understanding such mech-
anisms, of course, would be a major step toward bilateral and multi-
lateral harmonization of transfer pricing policy.
Furthermore, trilateral proceedings would permit a single pro-
ceeding to take into account all information relevant to that pro-
ceeding. Thus, a domestic judicial proceeding could consider the
broader effects of its determination by reference to the tax policies
of the foreign government. Similarly, competent authority proceed-
ings in which the taxpayer could become an independent party of
right would benefit from the taxpayer's intimate understanding of
the details of its own tax planning and transfer pricing strategy.3 62
To a small extent, the IRS's advance pricing agreement policy tri-
angulates one means for constructing a safe harbor by permitting
prior agreement by a foreign competent authority.363 Nonetheless,
the APA procedure suffers from the same malaise that afflicts the
competent authority process because it provides no assurance of bi-
lateral acceptance.3 64 Therefore, even if a taxpayer is successful in
obtaining a favorable APA, it is not assured that it will be free from
double taxation.
2. Opening lines of communication among taxpayers and tax authorities
No true solution to the double taxation problem may be found in
the absence of meaningful communication between governments
and their taxpayers.3 65 In spite of the numerous benefits they offer,
competent authority negotiations, bilateral arbitration, and APAs
are closed proceedings, and the wisdom they may provide remains
out of the public eye.3 6 6 The measures now in place, effective
though they may be, cannot therefore benefit from their own prece-
dent.3 67 These shortcomings do, however, suggest their own solu-
362. See Mogle, supra note 6, at 277-78 (observing that true trilateral hearing would permit
taxpayer independent voice in proceeding and thereby give authorities advantage of hearing
taxpayer's perspective while limiting prejudicial effects of taxpayer's proactive participation).
363. See Rev. Proc. 91-22, 1991-1 C.B. 526, 530 (allowing for agreements between compe-
tent authorities concerning APAs).
364. See id. at 531 (discussing legal effect of APA and noting that APA is only binding
between individual taxpayers and IRS).
365. See Hunter, supra note 294, at 65 (proposing that listening to taxpayers' views and
cooperation between nations is only way to resolve problems of double taxation).
366. See Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 354 (attacking confidential nature of ex-
isting dispute resolution measures on grounds that they offer no guideline!; as to generally
applicable law and that they subject competitors to unequal treatment).
367. See supra notes 314-15, 326-28 and accompanying text (discussing problems with
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tion. If the end is agreement and multilateral understanding, the
means must be one that fully discloses the intentions and policies of
each party involved.
First, the results of all competent authority negotiations should be
made public and should be given precedential value. Not only
would such a policy provide a means for streamlining future negoti-
ations by offering a clear course of action under a given set of cir-
cumstances, but published guidelines would also provide taxpayers
more secure means of setting their own transfer pricing policies in
light of the stated policies of the governments to which they must
answer.
Second, the existing policy of sealing all APAs means that the
agreements' benefits can only be enjoyed by the select few who can
afford the costs involved.368 By keeping the details of specific trans-
fer pricing cases confidential, the IRS risks creating a private body
of law and incurring the wrath of future domestic litigation and in-
terminable competent authority negotiations. By opening the oper-
ative details of APAs to review by competent authorities and
taxpayers, the often confusing details of U.S. transfer pricing policy
and the means to satisfy the requirements of § 482 will be made far
dearer to all involved.
Finally, arbitration provisions such as those in the United States-
Germany Tax Convention and the EC Arbitration Convention
should be invoked whenever possible and should provide for publi-
cation of arbitral decisions.36 9 Openness in arbitration proceedings
could not help but illuminate the goals and policies of the nations
involved, and the resultant body of law would bring about a means
for settling future disputes that is far more useful than any of those
currently available.
CONCLUSION
The United States imposition of new transfer pricing regulations
has caused unrest and unease among foreign tax authorities who
keeping competent authority agreements and APAs confidential and advocating publication
of agreements and negotiations involved to provide precedential value).
368. See Wickham & Kerester, supra note 13, at 354 (asserting that "[t]axation by secret
negotiation and agreement instead of by prepublished rules of general application ... does
not comport with (this country's] democratic political values" because it creates unfair dispar-
ity between tax treatment of large, powerful businesses and smaller firms).
369. See supra notes 336-47 and accompanying text (discussing arbitration provisions in
U.S.-Germany Tax Convention and EC Arbitration Convention). Although the EC Arbitra-
tion Convention permits publication of decisions, it does not mandate it. See EC Arbitration
Convention, supra note 338, art. 12(2), at 15 (providing that decisions reached by competent
authorities may be published with consent of parties involved).
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remain puzzled by the regulations' application and who feel
threatened by the possible implications for their own fiscal policies.
The problem of transfer pricing disputes is not new, but it is ex-
panding at an ever-increasing rate. 7 0 International unity will be the
only means to avoid an avalanche of double taxation disputes. Sur-
viving that upheaval will require learning the lessons taught by pre-
vious disputes. That in turn will require open communication
among tax authorities and taxpayers in ways that are not yet avail-
able under international conventions. The solution remains hang-
ing in space, as one author has put it, "in much the same way that
bricks don't." 37 1 The decision now is whether to stand and wait for
the brick's impact, to run and hide, or to summon the courage to
catch it and mortar it into a mending wall.
370. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing growing interdependence of
world economy and increased number of multinational businesses in recent years).
371. DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE HITCHHIKER'S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 34 (Pocket Books 1981).
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